UNLV Retrospective Theses & Dissertations
1-1-1996

Jiang Qing and Cultural Revolution
Linda Longley
University of Nevada, Las Vegas

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalscholarship.unlv.edu/rtds

Repository Citation
Longley, Linda, "Jiang Qing and Cultural Revolution" (1996). UNLV Retrospective Theses & Dissertations.
3248.
http://dx.doi.org/10.25669/l7j3-jwpx

This Thesis is protected by copyright and/or related rights. It has been brought to you by Digital Scholarship@UNLV
with permission from the rights-holder(s). You are free to use this Thesis in any way that is permitted by the
copyright and related rights legislation that applies to your use. For other uses you need to obtain permission from
the rights-holder(s) directly, unless additional rights are indicated by a Creative Commons license in the record and/
or on the work itself.
This Thesis has been accepted for inclusion in UNLV Retrospective Theses & Dissertations by an authorized
administrator of Digital Scholarship@UNLV. For more information, please contact digitalscholarship@unlv.edu.

INFORMATION TO USERS

This manuscript has been reproduced from the microfilm master. UMI
films the text directly from the original or copy submitted. Thus, some
thesis and dissertation copies are in typewriter 6ce, while others may be
from any type o f computer printer.
The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the
copy submitted.

Broken or indistinct print, colored or poor quality

illustrations and photographs, print bleedthrough, substandard margins,
and improper alignment can adversely affect reproduction.
In the unlikely event that the author did not send UMI a complete
manuscript and there are missing pages, these will be noted.

Also, if

unauthorized copyright material had to be removed, a note will indicate
the deletion.
Oversize materials (e.g., maps, drawings, charts) are reproduced by
sectioning the orignal, begnning at the upper left-hand comer and
continuing from left to right in equal sections with small overlaps. Each
original is also photographed in one exposure and is included in reduced
form at the back o f the book.
Photographs included in the original manuscript have been reproduced
xerographically in this copy. Higher quality 6” x 9” black and white
photogaphic prints are available for any photographs or illustrations
appearing in this copy for an additional charge. Contact UMI directly to
order.

UMI
A Bell & Howell Information CompaiQr
300 North Zed) Road, Ann Arbor MI 48106-1346 USA
313/761-4700 800/521-0600

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

JIANG QING

and

CULTURAL REVOLUTION

by

Linda Longley

A Thesis Submitted in Partial Fulfillment
of the Requirements for the D egee of

Master of Arts
in
History

Department of History
University of Nevada, Las Vegas
December, 1996

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

UMI Number: 1383158

Copyright 1996 by
Longley, Linda
All rights reserved.

UMI Microform 1383158
Copyright 1997, by UMI Company. All rights reserved.
This microform edition is protected against unauthorized
copying under Title 17, United States Code.

UMI

300 North Zeeb Road
Ann Arbor, Ml 48103

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Copyright 1996 Linda Longley
All Rights Reserved

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

The Thesis of Linda Longley for the degee of Master of Arts in History is approved.

Chairperson, Sue Fawn^Chung, Ph.D

Examinmg
(aminiiK Committee
Cc
Member, Eugene P. Moehring, Ph.D.

Examining Committee Member, Mayumi Itoh, Ph.D.

Graduate Faculty Repre6efttative, William S. Leaf, M A

Dean of the Graduate College, Ronald W. Smith, Ph D.

University of Nevada, Las Vegas
December, 1996

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

ABSTRACT

This thesis will examine the role of Jiang Qing in the events o f China known as the
Cultural Revolution, and show that this revolution was affected in its political as well as its
cultural aspects by her influence. Historians have not carefully examined Jiang Qing's role
in China's history, and have commonly regarded her simply as "Mao's wife." The theme
that will be developed in this thesis is that she was of major importance in China during
the years 1966-1976, the period of the Cultural Revolution. Materials from a variety of
sources are analyzed and synthesized to support this position.

m
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Mao Zedong (1893-1976): Bora in Hunan. Founding member of the Chinese
Communist Party, 1921. The principle Chinese Communist political and military leader;
the "great helmsman." Chairman of the Chinese Communist Party, fr’om the founding of
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PROLOGUE

Stories of powerfril women rulers hold an especially fascinating place in the minds
o f both westerners and orientals, and China has produced its share of illustrious female
leaders. These include Wu Zetian of the Tang Dynasty, Empress Lu of the Han Dynasty,
and Ci X , the infamous "dragon lady" o f the Qing Dynasty. This thesis is an account of
one other such person, Jiang Qing, who was the wife o f Chinese Communist Party
Chairman Mao Zedong from the late 1930s until his death in 1976.
Jiang Qing (JQ) has been the subject o f two important biographies in English, and
non-controversial information about JQ that is included here usually comes from one or
both of these sources. The earlier of these. Comrade Chiang Ch'ing, by the American
historian Roxane Witke, was based on interviews granted to l^tk e by JQ in 1972, and
was published in 1977. ^ This book was the basis for a cover article in Time magazine,
March 21, 1977, and gave the American public its first detailed account o f JQ's life. JQ
controlled the material that was included in this book, and while it is valuable as a starting
point in assessing JQ and for a view of life inside China that was not generally available at
the time of writing, it is an incomplete and inaccurate account of JQ and her importance.
Ross Terrill, an Australian with a journalistic background, and who was at one
time a research associate at Harvard's East Asia Research Center, presented a more critical
and insightful biography of JQ in 1992. In Madame Mao : The White-Boned Demon,
Terrill traced details of JQ's life that had not been disclosed to Whke.^ What emerged
from Terrill's book was a picture of JQ that was less than flattering, and a picture in which
vii
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she was perhaps deserving o f the cruel characterization of the book's subtitle. Still,
Terrill's account lacked an appreciation of the role played by JQ in the politics o f China
during the Cultural Revolution (CR), and continued a tradition that regarded JQ as
important only for her cultural contributions.
Several books were o f special value in writing this thesis. Professor An Tai Sung,
although educated in America, provided an Oriental (Korean) perspective on events of the
CR. Written in 1972, his book Mao Tse-tung*s Cultural Revolution was an early scholarly
work that supplied good explanations for many o f the basic "ingredients" of the CR. It
lacked, however, an appreciation of the revolution's cultural significance.^ Books by
foreign journalists often had insights into the Chinese people that could not be obtained
fi'om the suspect documents o f the Chinese government, or the people themselves.
Stanley Kamow’s Mao and China, originally published in 1972, was such a book. A 3rd
edition (in 1990) allowed Kamow to include an account of the later years of the CR. Ms
detailed and well documented history presented more than a superficial analysis o f events,
and often broke through the bewildering maze o f facts with a plausible explanation as to
why those events took place.'* Fox Butterfield, another American journalist, lived in
Beijing in 1981 and gathered material for his report China: Alive in the Bitter Sea. He
presented a view of life in China after Mao, and found that Chinese were still hesitant to
speak finnkly about their experiences during the CR, for fear of political reprisals.^
Clare HoUingworth, a former British war correspondent, while writing about Mao
(Mao and the Men Against Mm), became preoccupied with JQ.^ Her study of China in
the years 1974-76 revolved more around JQ that it did Mao. Written firom a feminine
perspective, HoUingworth furnished insights into JQ that were not found in other sources.
A recent book by Mao's physician, Li Zhisui (The Private Life of Chairman Mao. 1994),
likewise exhibited an inordinate interest in JQ.^
viii
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Bonnie S. McDougall compiled a valuable collection of twelve scholarly articles on
the arts in the People's Republic of China (PRC).* Several of these articles are relevant to
this thesis, and they are referred to frequently. Books by K. H. Fan, ed.. The Chinese
Cultural Revolution: Selected Documents; the Asia Research Centre, The Great Cultural
Revolution in China; and James T. Myers, Jurgen Domes, and Erik von Groeling, eds.,
Chinese Politics: Documents and Analysis are compilations in English translation of
government documents originally written in Chinese.^ Historical background material has
been obtained from Craig Dietrich, People's China, John K. Fairbank, Edwin O.
Reischauer, and Albert M. Craig, East Asia: Tradition and Transformation, and Jonathan
D. Spence, The Search for Modem China.
The pinyin method of romanization of Chinese characters will usually be used here.
When citing material written prior to the adoption of this method in the early 1980s, the
spellings of the original sources will be retained, as it is under those spellings that those
materials are referenced and catalogued in English language libraries. The most common
occurrences of these spellings are "Chiang Ch'ing" (for Jiang Qing), "Mao Tse-tung" (Mao
Zedong), and "Peking" (Beijing).

IX
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CHAPTER 1

A STAR IS BORN
Setting the Stage

The fourth wife o f Mao Zedong was bom Li Chin in Shandong province, 1914. *
She was also known as Li Yunhe and Shu-meng. As a stage and film actress in Shanghai
in the 1930s, she adopted the name Lan Ping (Blue Apple). When she became Mao's wife,
she took the name Jiang Qing (Green River). In the Westem world she was known simply
as Madame Mao.
At the time of her birth, her father was over 60 years old, and her mother over 40;
her brothers and sisters were all much older. Her mother left her abusive husband to work
in different positions as a domestic servant, taking her young daughter with her, and these
early formative years were a period of instability for JQ. There is some indication that
JQ's mother may have worked in the household o f Kang Sheng, who became a key figure
in the PRC, and JQ may have met Kang at this time.^ At age seven, she was sent to the
household o f her grandparents, and after a short period of schooling, began to appear in
theatrical productions. Some reports indicated that she was kidnapped and forced into
this life by white slavers.^ This unstable environment o f her youth may explain her
readiness to abandon conventional life stries and her later attacks on the importance of the
family in traditional Chinese culture.
1
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In 1930, JQ had a marriage of a few months duration to a merchant, a Mr. Fei, in
the city of Jinan.'* In 1931, she began living in the city of Qingdao with Yu Qiwei, a
communist underground leader, and at that time showed an early interest in communist
ideology. Accounts of these years of JQ presented her as a woman of distinctive and
strong personality. She was described as a woman who was pretty, vivacious, perky and
spontaneous; cocky, bold, aggressive, pushy, arrogant, unpredictable and difficult to
please. She was also petty, spiteful, outspoken and abrasive; head-strong, self-willed,
vengeful and vindictive. Her manner was perceived as being theatrical and dramatic. She
was regarded as a woman of great courage and perseverance; fearless and independent,
opportunistic and ambitious, but shrewd, scheming, domineering and calculating. Clearly,
she projected different images o f her complex personality to different people. While the
circumstances of her life were to change, her character did not.
In 1934, she moved to Shanghai, the city known as the "Pearl of the Orient," and a
city which was perhaps the most cosmopolitan in all of China. While there, she had an
exposure to the life of the arts and artists, the liberal thinking of radical cultural
elements, and bohemian life styles. She was a willing participant in the avant-garde artistic
circles of Shanghai and during this time was "notorious for her promiscuity."^ Nora, the
rebellious and independent heroine of Ibsen's "A Doll's House" became a role model for
the equally rebellious JQ, and she successfully played the stage role of Nora in 1935.® Her
film and stage career in Shanghai was only moderately successful, however, and
individuals there that she held responsible for inhibiting her career would incur her wrath
in the later CR. It was here that she met, or re-met, Kang Sheng, who had become an
early Communist leader.
While in Shanghai, in 1936, she had a one-year marriage, described as "stormy" (it
involved public arguments, fights, and threats of suicide) to Tang Na, who was prominent
in artistic and community circles in that city.^ Her Shanghai years indicated a continuing
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interest in Communist left-wing activity. Communist affiliation was at that time no small
matter, as fears of reprisal, persecution, and even death were well founded. Communist
activity was carried out secretly and underground. Jiang Qing was herself imprisoned in
1934 by the Nationalist Government forces of Chang Kai-shek, the Goumindong (GMD),
for three (or perhaps eight) months.* Suspected communist sympathizers arrested at this
time were sometimes treated harshly, by being physically mistreated, or more leniently, by
being asked to leave the city. In that time of political uncertainty, there were no standard
legal procedures to be followed in cases of political deviance, and penalties depended on
decisions of local authorities. The date of her actual Chinese Communist Party (CCP)
membership is given as diversely as 1933 and 1940, with 1933 being the most widely
accepted year.^
JQ, as well as other dedicated Communists, did not separate political activity from
other aspects of life. Witke reported one striking example of this. While attending a
theater performance in 1936, JQ expressed outrage at an actress for playing the role of
mistress to a German general. This was not, in her opinion, a role suitable for a Chinese.
Other members of the theatrical troupe became so agitated at JQ's conduct that they
actually threatened her life.

It would be unusual in any culture for a member of an

audience to go backstage after a theatrical performance to berate a performer for "political
errors," much less to such an extent that the situation became life threatening. This
incident illustrated the passionate reactions that her personality was able to arouse. Her
attitude was similar to that of a single-minded religious zealot, seeing all of life, in her
case, as being painted with a political brush.
The Japanese invaded Shanghai in 1937. At this time, JQ traveled to Yanan,
where Mao Zedong had set up CCP headquarters at the conclusion of the famous Long
March. Mao was conducting public lectures at Yanan; JQ sat in front rows at these
appearances, and responded enthusiastically to his speeches. It was apparent that she and
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Mao did not meet by chance, but by JQ's design. Mao was certainly a willing participant
in their union, having been "captivated" by the "vivacious and attractive actress."**
The prospect of the marriage of JQ and Mao was not readily endorsed by other
party officials. "In the regimented community of Yanan, marriage was not a personal
afiair," and some Communist leaders there actually suspected JQ of being a GMD spy.*^
JQ's friend, Kang Sheng, attested to her Communist loyalty, and his sanction of the
marriage was decisive. The union was eventually approved by the Party leadership, but
with the understanding that JQ not involve herself in political affairs for, by some reports,
a period o f twenty years. *^ This was an extraordinary stipulation on the terms of a
marriage, and could not have been motivated by mere suspicion of JQ's possible GMD
ties. There is no record as to which individuals opposed the marriage, but they must have
included some of Zhou Enlai, Deng Xaoping, Lin Biao, and Liu Shaoqi, all of whom were
present at Yanan and were to remain in leadership roles in China after the founding of the
PRC. There was a suggestion in this incident that objectors to the marriage foresaw and
were fearful o f JQ's political ambitions, and this may have been an early attempt on the
part of the Communist Party hierarchy to prevent those ambitions from being realized.
However, there is a more innocent interpretation of this restriction. The acting
profession was held in low esteem by many Chinese, and these men, foreseeing Mao's
eventual leadership of the Communist Party, may not have wished for the country to be
"tainted" by having a former actress as First Lady. In support of this view, the New York
Times speculated that she was "kept down" for twenty years because of (potential) "moral
and political embarassment."*^ In any event, the marriage took place in 1938.*^ If in fact
JQ observed a twenty-year exclusion from political activity as a condition of this marriage,
this may account for her absence from the political scene until the 1960s.
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Rehearsal for Revolution

During the early 1940s, JQ was acting as Mao's secretarial assistant. Witke
referred to JQ at Yanan as a "mute observer." Given the self-serving purpose of the W tke
interviews, it is plausible that had JQ furnished Mao with political ideas of her own at that
time, she would have mentioned this.*® Yet, JQ may have had some influence on Mao.
HoUingworth stated that Mao's interest in culture was prompted by JQ.*^ Whether
prompted by JQ or not, Mao's interest in culture led to an event important for China's
cultural future.
In 1942, Mao presented an essay entitled "TaUcs at the Yanan Forum on Literature
and the Arts." This was an unusual topic for a military leader, and especiaUy for one who
was facing far more pressing issues at that time. China was at war with Japan, the
Communists forces were stiU in conflict with the Nationalist government headed by
Chiang Kai-shek, and Mao was solidifying his own leadership of the communist
movement. Yet Mao was a supreme theoretician, and, realizing the role that art could
play in govermnent, he developed in this essay a political foundation and rationale for
artistic work. He spoke of bourgeois and imperialist themes "which we call traitor
literature and art," and emphasized that "With us, literature and art are for the people. . .
There is in fact no such thing as art for art's sake, art that stands above classes or art that
is detached fliim or independent of politics." Mao recaUed the Leninist theme that
literature and art were "cogs and wheels" in the revolutionary machine, and even his
choice of words regarding art criticism was prophetic of events in the future CR;
"Literary and art criticism is one of the principal methods o f struggle in the world of
literature and art."**
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Mao soon implemented a practical application of this theory of the arts in Yanan.
Citing a Chinese tradition, "The use and adaptation by Chinese rulers of songs and dances
among the people, both for court ceremony and for public instruction, has a long history in
China," Mao politicized "yangge," which was a form of combination folk dance, music and
variety act. Traditional roles in this art form were replaced by groups of workers,
peasants, soldiers, and students. "Negative" characters were banished, and new words and
plots were introduced to emphasize patriotic themes.*^
Within the Chinese tradition, involvement in the realm of the arts by a political
leader was no small matter. "The Party's decision to mount large scale yowgge amounted
to a claim on the Mandate of Heaven." David Holm suggested that yangge was not
emphasized in the CR because JQ disliked folksongs and preferred the more refined
cultural medium of Beijing Opera.

Mao, well read in Chinese history, realized that a

legitimate government o f the Chinese people would include a policy involving their
cultural lives. Perhaps anticipating his future victory over the GMD, he sought to
establish an early Communist position on the arts. Yangge was an important aspect of the
lives o f the people, and even at Yanan there was an attempt by Mao to use art for the
political purposes of affecting the lives of the "masses."
Of such importance was Mao’s pronouncement at the Yanan Forum that "The year
1942 is widely regarded, both in China and by scholars in the west, as a watershed in the
history of modem Chinese literature and the arts."^* Terrill reported that "Years later, she
[JQ] said that she had influenced the Talks”but he provided no documentation for this
claim.

Witke did not record JQ as having had any part in that talk.
In those Yanan days, Mao advocated the theme that history was made by "the

people," or the masses. Chinese theatrical productions traditionally presented a series of
kings, princes, lords and ladies as main characters, and so gave a distorted version of
"reality." Mao's government intruded into the arts, to bring them into conformity with
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political reality. This idea evolved into a two-pronged assault on culture that was to find
expression in the later CR: criticism (i.e., rejection, by government dictate) of old artistic
models, and promotion (by governmental decree) o f new, approved aesthetic ideals. JQ
would recall Mao's words at this Forum many times during the CR.
The CCP arose in part as an alternative to the corruption and cruelty of the GMD
leadership, and diminished roles of local warlords. These three conflicting groups had
formed loose alliances to combat the threat of Japanese invasion in the late 1930s. After
WWn, Mao and the Communist Party emerged victorious over the GMD, the warlords
lost much of their influence, and China was "liberated" to Communism in 1949. Mao
based his new government on many ideas formulated in Yanan. And JQ was to remain
resentfiil of the feet that she was the only wife of a prominent Party leader who was not
"on stage" at Tiananmen Square on October 1,1949, at the official birth of the PRC.
The 1950s were a period of general poor health for JQ, for which she was often in
Moscow for medical treatment. Still, this decade was a period when she began to express
her own developing views on the relation between culture and politics. She initiated a
crusade against Mei Lanfang, "the greatest Beijing opera actor of his day," whom she
regarded as being "too attached to the old." She criticized one popular movie, "Inside
Story of the Qing Dynasty," because it accepted the existence of a foreign presence in
China in 1900, was critical o f the patriotic Boxers, and had been made in "decadent Hong
Kong." She attacked another movie, "The Story of Wu Xun," which had portrayed Wu's
life as a success story. Wu Xun bad been a beggar, who rose to a position of economic
prominence and philanthropy. Not content with portraying the movie as evil, and against
Mao's objections, JQ continued with an attack against the man himself as a way of making
it known that Wu's motivation (achievement of good through economic gain) was not
acceptable in the new governmental scheme of things.^^ This was an early instance when
JQ would speak for herself not Mao, when it suited her purpose.
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Bonnie McDougall expressed the opinion that the 19S0s were a decade of artistic
decline-in China as well. "There was hardly a single work o f written literature in the 1950s
and early 1960s that made a genuine claim to literary distinction," she wrote. "The
performing arts fared slightly better, though in general the same perceptions could apply."
She characterized the changing period in arts from the 1950s into the 1960s and 1970s as
involving "the attempted transformation, consciously implemented by the new state, of an
explicit, author-centered culture . . . into a mass, audience-centered culture."^'* This
meant in effect that artistic expression would be diverted to propaganda purposes.
Confirming this re-direction of the arts, Robert Hegel noted that "fiction by People’s
Liberation Army writers came to prominence just before the CR."^^
JQ received a few political appointments in the early 1950s, which included
memberships on a Film Guidance Committee and in a China-Russia Friendship
Association. As a member of the Guidance Committee o f the Ministry of Culture, she had
a reputation for interference. Edward Rice, American Foreign Service Officer and Consul
General in Hong Kong for 1964 to 1967, quoted Lu Dingyi, a Deputy Director of
Propaganda, as saying "When Comrade JQ is present, work becomes difficult."^® A
report by Mao's personal physician confirmed this view o f her irascibility: while working
on this Committee, she "behaved so arrogantly, claiming to speak for Chairman Mao, that
no one could get along with her."^^ Arrogance was to characterize her entire political life.
A more significant appointment came in the winter of 1951-52, when she was named head
of the secretariat of the General Office of the Party's Central Committee, which gave her
access to secret papers involving the governance of China.^* She was removed from aU of
these positions, for unclear reasons, but perhaps due to pressure from unknown party
leaders who, wishing to be rid o f her presence, recalled the terms of her marriage
agreement with Mao. She soon exerted her influence, however, in ways in which she
would no longer be dictated to, but would become the dictator.
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Chinese theater, as was true of so many aspects of Chinese life, was noted for its
complexity. "Perhaps the single most striking feature of the Chinese theatrical tradition is
its variety.

"Beijing opera. . . has been the nationally dominant form of theater in

China for at least one hundred years. However, it is only one among more than 360
indigenous, or traditional, forms of Chinese theater currently being staged, " wrote
Elizabeth Wichmann in 1983. Nor were these many forms simple variants of one another;
"Each of the more than 360 forms of traditional theater is well defined, having its own
characteristics, musical style and method of stylization.”^** Theatrical performances in
China usually contained music, and were referred to as "operas," rather than plays. It was
the Beijing Opera form of theater that JQ adopted for political usage, and these operas
were a key component in the CR that was to follow. The evidence suggested that these
ideas came from JQ.
After her health improved in the early 1960s, JQ held other minor governmental
positions that involved censorship and control o f the arts, especially films. Whenever
films placed capitalism or China's upper classes in a favorable light, or extolled individual
enterprise, she found them objectionable. She authored an article in the Summer o f 1961,
"The Good Traditions of a Certain Company of the Red Army," which contained little
substantial content, but which commended the company for their role in guarding Mao and
Lin Biao.^* It is significant that JQ's interests at this time were not confined to cultural
matters. In the early 1960s, she made "an enormous effort. . . to read basic Communist
literature and to educate herself in Marxism." These efforts were successful to the extent
that by the summer of 1965, she was "invaluable to the Chairman both as a reporter on
what people were thinking and saying and as a political advisor”(my emphasis).^^
While practical aspects o f communism were being implemented in rural areas via
communes and state control of land, what Marx called the "superstructure" of society —
education, literature, and the arts —was being neglected. In Communist doctrine, this

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

10
superstructure required the centrality of the state, its leaders, and their ideology.^^ Mao
perceived a need to revise the superstructure to provide support for the base, and he could
do this with a plan that would solve his political problems as well.
Mao's political problems were increasing during the early 1960s. These problems
included social inequities and an entrenched power of new bureaucratic elites.^'* This
involved what Mao viewed as corruption within upper levels of party management. In
feet, the misuse of power by party cadres had begun almost as soon as the PRC was
established. A "three-anti" campaign of 1951 bad targeted corruption, waste, and
excessive bureaucracy in the CCP, and a similar "five-anti" program began in 1952.
Although capitalists no longer "officially" existed in China, some cadres were perceived as
exhibiting such capitalistic traits as the pursuit o f material comforts and personal well
being. These bureaucrats exhibited a declining interest in Mao's theory of communism as
a continuing class struggle. Mao viewed the dachaus and limousines of Party leaders in
the USSR as symptoms of a "reactionary" direction Soviet Conununism had taken, and
Chinese-Soviet relations had deteriorated by 1960. Among "revisionist" views that Mao
objected to were the use of economic incentives in industrial and agricultural management,
over-reliance on technical skills, educational conservatism, copying Westem cultural
mores and having friendly feelings toward the USSR^^ There was no doubt that Mao
genuinely feared that Chinese Communism could take this same "perverted" course.
Mao's discomfort over this issue was given popular expression by Yang Xquang, a
high school student in Hunan province, who in an essay "Whither China?" referred to a
"decadent class" of high-ranking officials, who were no longer leaders, but who had
become "red capitalist" rulers, with high incomes.^® The lives of most Chinese revolved
around the "work unit" to which they were assigned, and CCP cadres controlled these
units. They had the power to regulate marriages, job transfers, places of residence and
many facets of daily life. The system lent itself to favoritism, similar to what in the west
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would be called "having connections," and the power o f these cadres was such that in
many cases t h ^ had simply replaced the old landlords in their exploitation o f workers.
Further adding to Mao's troubles were policy problems with local leaderships,
especially those in Beijing. The "Hundred Flowers" campaign o f Spring, 1956, in which
Mao had invited public criticism of his government, produced such an unexpected
expression o f dissatisfaction, especially among intellectuals, that Mao reacted quickly to
suppress this dissent. The ensuing "Anti-rightist" campaign, wherein hundreds of
thousands of outspoken Chinese were sent to the countryside, produced a loss of
confidence in his ability to lead. Economic disasters resulting fi"om the Great Leap
Forward (1958-61) added to this loss of confidence. Liu Shaoqi, then vice chairman of
the CCP, was advocating general policies of "social stability," and "two lines" of Chinese
Communism, Maoism and Liuism, were emerging. Mao saw China's problems as based in
class struggle, and Liu saw them as caused by corruption among local cadres. Mao
regarded "communism" as a continuing process, while Liu, inclining to a Soviet view,
believed that the principles of communism would result in a stable society. These
theoretical differences caused wide differences in policy. Mao hoped to solve these
problems with the Socialist Education Movement (SEM), which lasted fi*om 1962 to
1965.
The "Early Ten Points" of May, 1963, replaced by "The Later Ten Points" in
September, set up the SEM, which was primarily designed to benefit rural areas and
increase agricultural output. The even later "Twenty-three Articles," of January, 1965,
indicated a continuing struggle between Mao and his opponents, especially Liu, over the
issues of this movement. The twenty-three points "became the crucial document that led
to the conflict between Mao and his opponents during the CR."^^
One important point of dispute between Mao and Liu Shaoqi was over the method
of dealing with party cadres who were found to be "mistaken" in their political thinking.
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Mao advised a tolerant, permissive attitude, which would allow wayward cadres to repent,
as it were, of doctrinal errors, while they continued in their positions. Liu advocated a
radical approach, whereby cadres would be dismissed. In illustration o f this disagreement,
Wang Guangmei, wife of Liu Shaoqi, headed one work party team (as part of the SEM) at
Qinghua University in Beijing, where she dismissed University Communist Party members
without giving them a chance to reform through self criticism.^* By replacing these
members with a new set of leaders, which consisted largely o f children of other party
ofBcials who were friendly to herself and her husband, she further antagonized the
Maoists. The disagreements of the SEM thus involved wide scale persoimel policies.
During this period, JQ became more vocal in her attacks on what she regarded as
cultural deviance. She began to criticize artistic productions, directors, producers, etc.,
for presenting "wrong ideas," which may have meant merely a favorable or even neutral
presentation of capitalism, such as having a well-dressed capitalist on a stage. She
enjoyed "throwing her weight around," and arts personnel resented being told how to "do
their job" by the wife of the Communist Party chairman. Witke mentioned that JQ began
making "inroads" into television broadcasting in the early 1960s.^^ Robert Elegant, head
of the Los Angeles Times' Hong Kong bureau during the CR, wrote that her initial
"meddling" in opera and motion pictures was simply "regarded as a nuisance," and he
even suggested that there was an element o f sexism involved; "Disarmed by their own
prejudices, the moderates refused to consider a female a serious threat," and in light of
future retributions against some of these theater figures, he added: "Had they known
Mao's wife better, Mao's enemies might have feared the vengeful starlet more.'"*® A
consequence of Mao's Yanan talk on the arts was that "a committee was set up for the
specific purpose o f revising old pieces to conform with Communist doctrine.'"** This
committee was formed in 1948, indicating that the political apparatus was already in place
for JQ's use in implementing her operatic revisions.
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JQ was named as having written her own opera, "Spark Among the Reeds." This
later became "Shajiabang," which was one of eight original "model operas" produced to
express the new political attitudes of the CR. Initially, this play concerned eighteen
wounded Chinese soldiers who were hidden from the Japanese by an elderly woman, a tea
house operator in the city o f Sh*yiabang. When the soldiers recovered, the woman, an
underground Communist agent, led them in an attack on Japanese forces in the area. JQ
changed the plot, and had the troops led by their own oflBcer, who acted on inspiration of
Mao's thought. JQ struggled with other composers and performers to rid "Shajiabang" of
western influences.'*^ Peng Zhen, mayor of Beijing, a Party ofiBcial who was influential in
Beijing cultural circles, and a fliend of Liu Shaoqi, objected to allowing the revised opera
to be performed. Publicity and funding were denied to JQ. These were disagreements
that she would not soon forget. Peng was no longer a vague political opponent of Mao,
but was now a personal enemy.
Under JQ's supervision, other plays were re-written to reflect the new view o f
"political correctness." Villains were dressed in rags, and kept ofiFcenter stage. Heroes
and heroines, no longer representing upper classes, were portrayed as common people.
They had all the "good lines," and even dismounted horses majestically. JQ was said to
have advocated an artistic theory of "three prominences," which involved an emphasis on
good characters, the story's heroes, and on the main hero.'*^ These three prominences
became important enough that they "had a strangle hold on the novel.

Robert Hegel

attributed the three prominences theory to both JQ and Yao Wenyuan, an accomplished
Communist writer from Shanghai who was to become with JQ one o f the Gang of Four.
Hegel explained that it was "a theory that took to further extremes the theme of
'revolutionary romanticism' developed in the 1950s," and that the new themes appealed to
the less well educated.'*^
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In the spring o f 1962, Mao asked JQ to draft an arts policy, which became the
"May 16th circular" (a second "May 16th circular" was issued in 1966). This statement
was presented to the Central Committee of the Communist Party, and was a summary of
Mao's arts policies as presented at Yanan.'*^ JQ's ofBcial position on the proper ftmction
of opera contrasted with her private tastes, which ran to the salacious and erotic. She and
her friend Kang Sheng spent two months together in the spring of 1962 in Hangzhou,
where they "forced" theatrical groups to perform these entertainments.**^ This was but
one instance of the discrepancy between her preaching and her practice.
JQ had also been at work producing other "model operas," which served as
prototypes of future Beijing operas, and which were in experimental production at this
time. These models included five operas proper: "The Red Lantern," "Shajiabang," "Raid
on the White Tiger Regiment," "On the Docks" and "Raiding the Bandits' Stronghold,"
which later became "Taking Tiger Mountain by Strategy." This last opera, finished in
1970, was an example of the 'three prominences' theory.*** Completed by 1966 were two
ballets, "The White Haired Girl" and "The Red Detachment of Women." Another work
was a symphony based on the music of "Shajiabang." These eight are regarded as the core
o f the Cultural Revolution dramatic presentations.**^ None of the operas were set earlier
than the 1920s, when the CCP began, and all but "On the Docks" involved the theme of
war. They carried the messages of class struggle, continuing revolution, the teachings of
Maoism, and the creation of heroic images of workers, peasants, and soldiers (i.e., "the
masses"). The model operas became "immediately very popular" and were a cultural
centerpiece of the CR.^® This is an important point, as many commentators on the CR
view it as having little to do with culture. "Revolutionary Beijing Operas are the backbone
o f virtually all theatrical production in the country," and they were "directed by JQ, the
militant wife of Mr. Mao, and a leader o f the CR," reported Seymour Topping o f the New
Lin 1971.^* Yet, the operas were of dubious artistic merit. Deng Jûaoping,
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who was Mao's successor after a brief period when Hua Guofeng held that position,
expressed a common opinion when he commented on the plays; "You just see a bunch of
people running back and forth on the stage. Not a trace of art."^^ In a Acetious note,
Deng remarked that he did not mind JQ's producing operas, as long as he did not have to
watch them.^^ Deng, at least, was not intimidated by JQ
At a Beijing Spring Opera Festival in 1964, Mao's position with regard to artists
had hardened: "It is necessary to drive all singers, poets, playwrights, and writers fi-om
the cities to the countryside." Plays portraying "ghosts [i.e. gods, or fictions], emperors,
princes, generals, ministers, scholars and beauties" were to be banned.^** The emperors,
princes, etc., were to be replaced in artistic presentations by peasants and common people,
who were the genuine heroes of the communist world. The goal o f artistic creation was to
be the glorification of the common man.
This festival was not an annual event, and was apparently organized as an
opportunity for JQ to present her new theatrical ideas. Colin Mackerras analyzed this
festival: "Possibly the most important sign o f the ascendency o f JQ's views was the
Festival o f Beijing Opera on Contemporary Themes, held in the capital from 5 June to 31
July 1964." JQ was given credit for having "persuaded artists to resist 'counter
revolutionary revisionists' like Peng Zhen, who, it was claimed, wanted them to perform
traditional operas." After this festival, "traditional dramas were performed in Beijing only
on a few special occasions. . . other cities soon followed Beijing’s example.

Mackerras

attributed the ideas o f these operas to JQ, not to Mao or the Maoists.
Twenty-eight opera companies, representing nineteen provinces, cities and regions,
presented thirty-seven new operas at this festival. JQ's "maiden speech" was given during
this event, but it was not published until three years later, due, she told Witke, to political
interference.^® Beijing Operas were an important influence in the daily lives of the Chinese
people. For a number of years thereafter, the model operas represented the only "culture"
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available, and they were, as has been indicated, instruments o f political indoctrination.
NCnister o f Culture Lu Dingyi, under whose authority the Festival was authorized (at the
direction o f the Central Committee of the Politburo), commented that "The reform of
Beijing Opera is a major event. It is not only a cultural revolution but also a social
revolution.

Edward Rice, however, questioned Lu's sincerity on this occasion.^*

These comments by a single high-ranking leader, appearing in CCP sources, were taken as
the oflBcially approved position and indicated widespread acceptance. But %ain from an
artistic standpoint, the plots o f the operas were predictable, and "The model operas spelled
the end of the [moral] complexity that modem fiction had shared with the old literati for
most of a decade."^® JQ also authored a book on the topic o f these operas.®®
In an incident that was to become of major importance, Mao found one opera,
"Hai Rui's Dismissal," particularly offensive. Wu Han, author of the play, was a vice
mayor o f Beijing, although his duties in this capacity were honorary rather than political.
Wu was a prominent writer and historian, a professor at Beijing University, and a leading
authority on the Ming dynasty (1368-1644).®* He was one o f many Beijing intellectuals
who were not in agreement with all o f Mao's policies, and was on good terms with Peng
Zlien, Beijing's mayor (and was thus allied with Liu Shaoqi). The play was first performed
in 1961. It had been gaining in popularity, and was performed in several locations.
Ostensibly, it recounted an event in the life of an actual Ming Dynasty ofScial, Hai Rui,
who angered the emperor by deciding a case involving land ownership and criminal
misconduct o f a wealthy landlord in favor of a peasant. Wu's play was interpreted by
many, with justification, as a criticism o f Mao, who had in 19S9 dismissed Peng Dehuai, a
popular general and Minister o f Defense, for criticizing the policies of the Great Leap
Forward. In early 1965, Mao appointed JQ, Yao Wenyuan, and Zhang Chunqiao to
prepare a critical review o f this play. Yao Wenyuan was a talented communist writer with
a reputation for biting sarcasm, and Zhang Chunqiao was at that time a journalist, a
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Director of Propaganda, and a high-ranking Party leader in Shanghai. (Yao Wenyuan and
Zhang Chunqiao were both included in the subsequent "Gang of Four.")
The critical review was published in a November, 1965, editorial in the Shanghai
RiBao, the daily newspaper, and was soon reprinted in the Beijing People's Daily. The
play was denounced as containing "monsters and demons," and as being a "poisonous
weed." It was to be a theme of the CR that catch phrases and slogans assumed the
significance of a religious litany, due to their mind-numbing repetition, and soon monsters,
demons and poisonous weeds, although never precisely defined, were found everywhere.
But the lengthy editorial was more than a literary review. It outlined in detail the "political
errors" o f the play, such as the portrayal of peasants as passive, or illustrating the principle
that there was no need for a revolution to achieve justice fi-om a ruling class.®^ Over one
hundred further articles, representing both sides o f the controversy surrounding the play
and its review, were soon to appear.®^ The main points at issue regarded the extent to
which the play was to be taken as serious political theory, as the Maoists contended, or as
simply an artistic work, to be interpreted on esthetic and academic grounds, as the Liuists
advocated. Thus, the play struck at the deep divisions within the two lines of Chinese
Communism. The controversy raised public awareness that political considerations would
have an increasing impact on their daily lives. The review had fatal consequences for Wu
Han, who eventually died of harassment, perhaps a suicide, and his family and supporters.
Some historians regarded this "Hai Rui" incident as the point of origin for the CR
Because she had been entrusted with the preparation of the important review of
"Hai Rui's Dismissal," JQ's stature and influence within the CCP increased. In December,
1964, she served as representative fi-om Shantung Province in a National People's
Congress. (Theoretically, this Congress was China's highest governing authority,
but in feet it merely endorsed the decisions of the CCP leadership.) Her "oflBcial" political
credentials were becoming established. She developed contacts within the military, and
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with People's Liberation Army (PLA) help, organized conferences on artistic topics from
1964 to 1966.®** Although these forums were centered in Shanghai, they were "followed
by a series of national, r%ionaL and local conferences throughout the army."®^ In
February, 1966, an unusual alliance was announced. A Forum on "Work in Literature
and Art in the Armed Forces" was held; Lin Biao, head of the PLA and successor to Peng
Dehuai as Minister o f Defense, asked JQ to preside over this event. The political point of
this alliance was to strengthen Mao's position within the PLA by having his wife direct
their "cultural efforts!" In his address to this delegation, Lin Biao made Party leadership
intentions clear; "Comrade Chiang Ch'ing [JQ ]. . . has many opinions, and they are very
valuable. You should pay good attention to them and take measures to insure that they
are applied ideologically and organizationally." ®® Meisner noted "the curious spectacle of
the army, assisted by Mao's wife, JQ, involving itself in the reform o f the traditional
Beijing opera. "®^ Later, in November of 1966, JQ was ofBcially named as a cultural
advisor to the PLA. She was fond o f emphasizing this new identification by wearing army
fatigues, her new "costume."
JQ was asked to write a summary of this February forum. Her words were
significantly and carefully chosen, and included the following points:
1 - there was ideological justification for a proposed revolution in culture
(referring to Mao's thoughts on culture presented at Yanan);
2 - there had been widespread soldier, worker, and peasant activity
in the Socialist Cultural Revolution over the past 3 years;
3 - the PLA was the chief instrument of the dictatorship of the
proletariat in China, and it must play an important role in the revolution;
4 - the CR must involve both destruction and construction; and
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5 - revolutionary and militant art and literary criticism by the
masses was to be encouraged.®*

For JQ, "art criticism by the masses" meant destruction and elimination of art
objects found to be objectionable. This criticism was to be carried out by the armed might
and "aesthetic judgment" of the PLA, and it was an ominous sign that culture had thus
become linked with militaiy force. "As JQ's power status grew, she became increasingly
unscrupulous in her interference in Nfilitary afl&irs."®^ This interference extended to
recommendations for appointments to higher positions within the PLA, and reflected
growing differences between JQ and Lin Biao.
The forum summary was written partially in response to a report, the February
Outline, authored by Peng Zhen, who had been chairman of a five-member CR group.
This summary was known as "The Jiang Qing Thesis."^® For Mao, the CR was intended
to involve political issues, while the February Outline, continuing a point of disagreement
arising fi-om the "Hai Rui" controversy, urged that it be kept on an academic level. The
February Outline report, and JQ's Thesis, represented "Two diametrically opposed
documents," representing the "two lines" of Chinese Communism.^*
JQ also co-authored a second May 16th circular, four years after the original May
16th circular of 1962, which further discredited the February Outline report. This was a
strongly worded document, beginning "The Central Committee has decided to revoke the
'Outline Report on the Current Academic Discussion Made by the Group of Five in
Charge of the Cultural Revolution'," and continued "The outline covers up the serious
political nature of the struggle." In intimidating, tough language, it presented detailed
attacks on the February Outline, and listed ten theoretical errors committed therein,
including accusations that it had violated the Marxist thesis that aU class struggles are
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political struggles7^ It included an attack on Peng Zhen, but gave a "gross
misrepresentation o f what had occurred" in the five-member committee under Peng's
direction.

Misrepresentation and character assassination were to be common techniques

of JQ in assaults on opponents. The circular repeated the idea that there was to be "no
construction without destruction," and stressed the importance o f the PLA. One effect of
the circular was to have the five-member committee replaced by a new eighteen-member
Cultural Revolution Group. The circular was presented to the Central Committee in
August.
In May, as the political events of 1966 unfolded, the eighteen-member Cultural
Revolution Group essentially usurped the role of the Politburo and made political
decisions for the country.^** Chen Boda, editor of Red Flag, the Communist Party policy
journal, and who also acted as Mao's political secretary and speech writer, was head of
this group. JQ was its "first deputy," a title given to emphasize that she was not just an
ordinary group member. But Bamouin and Yu stated that JQ had "effectively taken
charge" of this group, and that she "humiliated Chen Boda openly" when he criticized her
"fi-equent violent outbursts.

The historian Tang Tsou wrote that the transformation of

the informal group consisting of JQ, Chen Boda, and their followers prior to the CR into
the core of the CR Small Group illustrated the transformation of an informal group into a
formal unit.^® By putting together the ideas that this informal group had become a formal
unit, that it had usurped the fimction of the politburo, and that JQ controlled this group,
the conclusion is that at this critical time, May-June, 1966, JQ was the single most
influential individual in the Chinese Communist hierarchy. Indeed, there were not always
clear lines of command within the Chinese government. JQ's proximity to Mao, together
with her increased political prestige, made it difBcult for anyone in authority to deny her
requests or demands. Did she always speak for Mao? Or, on whose authority did she act?
These questions had no answers.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

21
Wang Li was a high-ranking party official, a member o f the new eighteen-member
Central Cultural Revolution Group, and was frequently given the task of writing official
party documents. His detailed account of the early days of the CR, published in English in
1994, made it very clear that JQ had assumed a central position at this time. "She [JQ]
called daily meetings of this group" and "represented the Chairman when issuing
directives.

. JQ was not even a Central Committee member, but she was the one who

seeded the standing committee members. This was rare in party history." When Chen
Boda and Kang Sheng were absent from the meetings of the team drafting the May 16th
Circular, "JQ [was] in sole charge." When Deng Xiaopeng was elected to the standing
committee by a unanimous vote, JQ reprimanded Chen and Kang; "You all had votes,
why did you let Deng get a unanimous vote? What were you doing?" JQ had begun an
early campaign to discredit Deng, who was allied with Liu, and was a recognized rival of
Mao. She was also at this time continuing to denounce Liu, and was criticizing Chen
Boda for giving Liu editorial assistance. Even Kang "was very nervous.

Wang's article

was a complete testament, from a unique vantage point, to the influence that JQ was
wielding in the spring o f 1966.
On May 25, 1966, Beijing University (known as "Beida") experienced protests
against the University president, who was also the head of the University Party
Committee. These incidents were initiated by Nie Yuanzi, a member of the Beida
Philosophy faculty, and were instigated, according to John Byron and Robert Pack, by
Kang Sheng.

As JQ was a personal acquaintance of Nie Yuanzi, the protests could not

have occurred without her prior knowledge and approval. Nie made use of "wall posters,"
large hand-written signs hung for public display, to attack specific individuals by name.
Mao soon gave his approval to these posters. In the confusion occasioned by these
events, "Mao's endorsement of the posters electrified Beijing University," and individuals
found themselves having to declare their allegiance in what became an escalating
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political controversy.^^ The text of Nie's posters was published on June 2 in People's
Daily and was headlined "Big Character Poster Exposes Large Conspiracy."*® A public
mass movement on June 18, designed to embarrass university administrators, turned into a
riot. The poster attacks were taken as assaults on all intellectuals who were viewed as
opposed to Mao's authority.
Mao's endorsement o f the wall poster phenomena was no doubt hastened because
the attack came in the intellectual center of Beijing, where he had political opponents of
long standing duration. The posters, Mao felt, were a means by which the masses could
express concerns, since many o f the usual media sources were under the control o f his
"enemies. " "Posters written in big characters are an extremely useful new type of
weapon," he noted.** In August, he contributed a wall poster of his own, "Bombard the
Headquarters," which meant that people were to question or criticize members of the
communist hierarchy whom they viewed as back-sliding. For a Chinese peasant,
"headquarters" was the local government official to whom they were immediately
responsible. This slogan was an attempt by Mao to enlist the masses in his effort to rid the
Party o f corrupt local cadres, and was in keeping with his "anti" campaigns of the 1950s.
Wall posters may seem a quaint way of communication, but they were a dramatic
and effective means of attracting attention. They gave the appearance of coming
spontaneously from "the people" rather than from government sources. Wall posters were
a first indication that someone could expect trouble for being accused of being a counter
revolutionary, or a "capitalist roader." They were avidly watched, especially by people
fearful of being named, who began to worry about who was for them and who was against
them. While the use of wall posters was not new (they had been used in student
demonstrations as early as the 1920s), their occurrence became widespread throughout
China during the CR.*^ Wall posters did reveal some scandals, but they were also used to
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exaggerate, manufecture, or exploit spurious grievances. The New York Times referred
to wall posters as "uniquely Chinese ideological weapons."*^
On June 1 of 1966, JQ presented a speech explaining that the purpose of the CR
was to "uproot revisionism."*^ Also in June, the PLA took over the People's Daily and
an editorial urged "the masses" to "sweep out all monsters and ghosts," by which was
meant bourgeois, capitalist and religious ideas and superstitions. This was the very
language of JQ, extended from the field o f the arts to the broader political arena, and
showed that her influence had expanded b^ond the sphere of the arts. As one indication
of this trend, older films were removed from public circulation. JQ became Secretary to
the Standing Committee of the Politburo in June, even though she was not then a
Politburo member.*^ And at Beida on July 22, she gave a radical speech urging that "It is
time to overthrow the bourgeois academic clique."*®
A letter from Mao to JQ dated July 8, 1966, suggested that she pay attention to
the problem that Communist parties world-wide were abandoning Marxism. This
indicated that Mao had accepted JQ as a person with whom he could share problems of
international political concern. He cautioned her that she should not become "dizzy with
success," a reference to the achievements as he saw them at that time, of the CR. He
noted that not all of the "rightists" of the party could be overthrown at once —and added
that more ghosts and monsters would be eliminated when more of the movement was
launched "after seven or eight years. "*^ How little Mao, or anyone, knew then of the
consequences of the events that he had initiated.
Another phenomena, the establishment of a "cult of Mao," also arose in the
summer of 1966. Lin Biao, head of the PLA, authorized publication and widespread
distribution of the book Quotations of Chairman Mao, better known in the West as The
Little Red Book. Mao's birthplace was made into a Chinese mecca. It was in contrast to
his attempts to keep out of the limelight at this time that Mao allowed this to happen.
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It is easy to explain his actions as being motivated by a desire to have his name and
prestige promoted and prominent at a time he was about to launch the CR, and this may
be true in part. But there was another, subtler, reason that may have been a factor here.
One way in which this cult following was expressed was this:
Long live the great Communist Party of China!
Long live the great leader. Chairman Mao!
Long live the great and invincible Mao Zedong's thought!**
This expression gave prominence to the thought of Mao, as if that was in some way
separable from the man himself. It is possible that Mao wished the masses to adhere to his
th o u ^t, which would in any case outlive Mao the person, and it was to be his
revolutionary ideas that were to be the core of the communist expansion into the mental
lives of the people. And who, it would be thought by many, understood the thought of
Mao better than Madame Mao?
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CHAPTER 2

JIANG QING ON STAGE
Center Stage: 1966-68

As the CR began, JQ had taken on a political importance of her own. She was
also becoming important to others as a conduit to Mao. The historical record o f China of
this period presents Mao as such a dominate political leader that it is easy to regard JQ as
"merely" Mao's wife. Mao, so the story that we have been conditioned to believe goes,
was the political leader and controller o f China's destiny. Having been indoctrinated with
that scenario, it is not easy to accept the possibility that at critical points in reaching that
destiny, it was "Mao's wife," not Mao, who was making political decisions. As China
entered the years of the CR, officials showed less concern with "leading the country" and
more concern with personal survival. Policy decisions were replaced by personnel
decisions. It is the position of this thesis that JQ made these decisions for the "radical"
clique in this period, and that she was a spokesperson for Mao when Mao was declining to
speak for himself.
On August 8, 1966, the pieces were in place. At the Eleventh Plenary Session of
the Eighth CCP Central Committee, a program referred to as "The Sixteen Points" was
adopted, and the CR became official policy. To distinguish this program from cultural
efforts that had preceded it, and to give it an exclamation point, it was called "The Great
31
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Proletarian Cultural Revolution." Important features o f this program decreed that it
would "touch people's souls," that "courageous and daring pathbreakers" would carry out
the æms of the revolution (these daring pathbreakers would be the notorious Red Guards),
and that old ideas, culture, customs and habits would be changed. Productive segments
of the economy (that is, industry and agriculture), as well as PLA members, and scientists,
were to be exempted from disruption by the revolution.* Maurice Meisner, the noted Mao
scholar, referred to the Sixteen Points of August, 1966, as "the charter" of the CR.^
In the revolving door of the Chinese political hierarchy, Liu Shaoqi was out as
Mao's chosen successor after this session. He remained virtually powerless until his death
in 1969. Mao had at first advocated moderation in dealing with Liu, while JQ had
advocated extremism and his removal; "The Chairman's original intention was only to
demote Liu at the Eleventh Plenary Session." When Liu made a self-criticism that Mao
thought was very good, JQ objected to it, called it "terrible," and Liu had to continue with
his "confession." Later, Mao added '"If they [Lin Biao, Jiang Qing and Chen Boda] want
to overthrow [Liu], then let them do it!"'^ Professor S. K. CHiosh wrote "It was she who
was mainly responsible for harassing and humiliating the former Head o f State, Liu
Shaoqi, and the former Party Secretary, Deng Xiaoping and it was at her insistence that
Liu Shaoqi and Marshals He Long and Peng Dehuai were persecuted."** In the matter o f
Liu Shaoqi, JQ's view prevailed.
Another point o f disagreement between Mao and JQ also came after the Eleventh
Session. At a joint meeting of the Standing Committee and the Cultural Revolution Group
members called by Mao, "The Chairman instructed the session to criticize Liu Shaoqi. Lin
Biao and JQ were both of the opinion that Liu was not the chief threat, but that the chief
threat was Deng [Xiaoping].. . therefore, they ignored the Chairman's instructions and
lined up people to criticize Deng." Deng, "forced to hand over his work" to Kang Sheng
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told Kang "I can no longer carry on."^ This was not an isolated attack on Deng. JQ "led
a campaign to get Deng Xiaoping expelled from the CCP, as being a capitalist
roader and enemy of the people."® The result of these political maneuverings was that, at
the instigation of JQ and Lin Biao, both Liu and Deng lost their influence. As an
indication of Mao's growing inaccessibility, he was not at this meeting.
Wang Li stated that JQ was also opposed to Zhou Enlai as early as September,
1966, when she was "ready to get the Premier," and "Jiang Qing's machinations put the
Premier in an obviously difficult position." As an example of these machinations, "After
the central work conference [in October, 1966] Jiang Qing ousted Wang Renzhong and
Zhou Rongxin by uttering only one comment. . . Zhou Rongxin was the Premier's chief
aide in handling the Red Guards. He was abruptly ousted to hurt the Premier... The
Premier later told me: 'This event more than any other put me in a defensive position.'"^
Wang revealed the existence of yet another governmental agency in which JQ was
wielding influence. "The Central Case Examination Group" was parallel with the Central
Cultural Revolution Group, and evaluated conduct of party members. "JQ asked Kang
Sheng to suggest to the chairman the setting up of special case investigations on Liu,
Deng, and Tao [Tao Zhu, an ally of Liu Shaoqi and Head o f a Propaganda Department].
Mao protested: "It can't be done. They are all standing committee members elected by the
Eleventh Party Plenary Session of the Central Committee.' JQ's reply: "Well do it
nevertheless. Well include them all in Peng's [Peng Zhen] case.'" JQ "repeatedly stressed;
T will be in charge of the cases and will be directly accountable to the Chairman.'"*
Wang's entire report, written from the perspective of a high government insider
and participant in these events, reflected a major concern with JQ and her activities during
this period. The incidental way in which he recorded her actions indicated that they were
not unusual. There was a general acceptance o f JQ's political role, and a deference to her
opinion. Later, on May 1, 1967, for instance, "the Premier ordered that day's Renmin
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ribao [People's Daily] recalled and reprinted." The reason was to put the names of the
Cultural Revolution Group members above those o f the Central Committee members;
"the Premier had misgivings about JQ making a big deal about it after the paper came out.
JQ's position then was already above that o f the Politburo and secretariat."^
During these early days of the CR, JQ was already at work undermining Liu
Shaoqi, Deng Xiaoping, and 2%ou Enlai. Her supporters included Lin Biao (head of the
PLA), Chen Boda (Mao's secretary), Kang Sheng, Yao Wenyuan, Zhang Chunqiao and of
course Mao himself.
The revolution envisioned by JQ and her group was to be no small revision, or
passing fad for the arts. It was to be a wholesale program on a national scale to force
people to rethink their values and social roles. Mao perceived that the class struggle
needed to become sharper in the continuing war between the bourgeois and "counter
revolutionaries." Professor An Tai viewed the CR as a "spiritual" movement, designed to
mold Chinese Communism into Mao's image o f Communism as perpetual, total struggle.*®
In a broad sense, "culture" involved "education," and culture was to be the tool by which
the masses would be re-educated. This revolution did not involve education in the
traditional sense, as schools were closed in June of 1966. (The original temporary
suspension of schools was extended to a period of four years.) Nor was this re-education
to be an easy, painless, process. It was to involve more than government propaganda
campaigns, and more than simple, individual brainwashing. It was to be a way in which
people would be forced to look within themselves for self-criticism, and to rely upon
group support to discover correct ways o f thinking. Old thought patterns were to be
abandoned; the psychology of self-interest, and its political manifestation in capitalism,
had truly to be rejected.
This was to be a revolution, an idealistic revolution at that, to purge peoples' minds
of such "false beliefs" as the primary importance of their own welfare and well-being. The
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cultural revolution was to strike at the foundation of human nature, at the very ways
people think and believe. The virtues of concern or regard for others, or consideration for
the importance of the group, were to be the primary and sole virtues. Robert Elegant
described the CR as "history's single most audacious endeavor to transform the essential
character of a nation, a society, and hundreds of millions of human beings."** Given the
Marxist philosophical view of the inevitability of communism on an international level, the
CR was designed to transform the thinking of all mankind. Eric Sevareid, an American
journalist, grasped this essential feature of the CR when he asked another American
journalist, James (Scotty) Reston, "But you don't believe, do you Scotty, that they’re
going to succeed, by social means, by political means, o f changing the nature of the human
mind?"*^ This question was posed as an afterthought within the context of a general
discussion of Reston's visit to China in 1971, and was given little notice.
The CR is understood to be the creation of Mao Zedong, and to a large extent it
was. But this paper will examine the significant and pivotal role played by JQ in this
compelling drama. Who, but a person experienced in the craft of the theater, could evoke
the emotions of the masses (a captive national audience existing btyond the artificial
constraints of spectators in a theater), and stir them to action on the world's stage? Who
had experience in the arts, and knew the communist principles to be applied there? Who
desired the center of the stage, and the applause of the crowd? JQ was the perfect person
for this highly visible role, which exactly fit the character of Lan Ping, the actress. At the
precise moment in Chinese history when Mao needed a new weapon to neutralize his
political opponents and promote his political agenda, his wife was leading a reform
movement in the Chinese performing arts. Culture became of primary significance, and
aligned with education. The Cultural Revolution was bom, and Madame Mao was ready,
experienced, prepared, and eager to act as its spokesperson. Terrill noted that "It was a
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coincidence of great importance that JQ was both a specialist in the performing arts and a
resurgent figure within the Mao court.

But this was no coincidence. JQ had actively

and deliberately created the circumstances o f this situation, which represented a perfect
psychological and historical union between a pa*son and an idea.
One point o f the sixteen point agenda was that members of the bourgeoisie were
still trying to use old ideas, culture, customs, and habits to corrupt the masses. These four
concepts —ideas, culture, customs and habits —which very much define the essence of a
nation, became the "four olds." Rejection and elimination of the four olds became rallying
points of the early stages of the revolution. The attempt to change a nation in its
fundamental character by government edict was to entail resistance, horror, bloodshed,
and tragedy. The "Anti-Four Olds" campaign was a far, far different program than, for
instance, an economic Five Year Plan.
The "daring pathbreakers" of the Sbcteen Point Program proved to be Red Guard
(RG) members, who, in the initial stages of the CR, were groups o f Chinese youths, many
o f them students, organized by Mao. From August through November of 1966, between
11 and 13 million Chinese youths came to Beijing for a series of eight rallies. The London
Times reported JQ's presence at the opening of one of these rallies, and noted that she
"has recently emerged fi-om years out of the news to play an important part in the CR."
These youths were to form the core of the RG movement. They were a paramilitary force
used by JQ, and the early years of the CR were characterized by the actions of these RG
groups. The Sixteen Point Program was ambiguous both in defining the extent to which
"the masses," who were essentially these RG units, would be permitted to use violence to
enforce the new views, and in a vague distinction between "good" and "bad" party
members. These ambiguities allowed for differing interpretations of the program's intent,
and RG units soon engaged in government sanctioned rampages against "bad" elements.
The slogan "destruction before construction," which had been revived at the Eleventh
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Session, suggested that violence by the RGs would be tolerated, and RG groups were
quick to react to this suggestion.
JQ was now speaking with political authority. She, and others of the CR leaders,
warned these RGs of a "stormy class struggle," and of the need to eradicate "the four
olds." RGs were urged to question parental and pedagogical authority, and "drag out
capitalist readers." T h ^ were told to carry out a process of struggle-criticismtransformation, which bore an analogy to a individualized version of Marx's thesisantithesis-synthesis triad. In practice, this process became one of coercion and
intimidation. The American historian Edward Rice spoke of this period as "The
Unleashing of Madam Mao," although if the premise of this thesis is correct, she needed
no unleashing. Rice confirmed that at this time "she appeared to have become the de facto
leader of the Cultural Revolution Group," and that "it was the purge aspects of the CR
that were uppermost in her mind."^^
Persons purged included lower ranking cadres as well as members of the CCP
upper hierarchy. But the effects of the destructive phase of the CR were felt through all of
Chinese society. Any person, on any whim, could be targeted, harassed, and "criticized."
In the apt phraseology of Jonathan Spence, persons could be subject to "allegations of
unspecified crimes committed at unspecified times.

Franklin W. Houn, bom and

educated in China, was a member o f the Chinese GMD government firom 1946 to 1948,
and in the 1960s was a Professor of Political Science at the University of Massachusetts.
He was in a position to see China through Chinese eyes without fear of government
censorship or reprisals. Houn reported that thought reform had been a well-established
aspect of Chinese education under communism, and typically consisted of three phases; 1
- group identification, 2 - personal and emotional self-criticism and confession, and 3 denunciation of one's reactionary or bourgeoisie father, and rebirth into the new
communist order.

The organized "struggle meetings" that took place in the CR were a
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phenomena that expanded and brutalized this procedure. These meetings were forms of
kangaroo courts designed to humiliate and elicit confessions.
OflScially, JQ was one person in authority over RG groups, and her use of these
units was at times particularly effective. Her theatrical abilities enabled her to arouse their
passions and motivate them to action against targets deemed objectionable. By convincing
them that they, the common people, were the real heroes of life, she provided government
sanction for them to act as judge, jury, and executioner. Kamow reported that "[JQ]
carried enormous weight with the radicals," and "the young radicals admired JQ."^^ One
RG member wrote that "Although JQ was nominally advisor to the Red Guards, we did
not think much of her at aU," but this seemed to be an isolated opinion.

The New York

Times reported that "The stenographic record o f CR rallies, carried by RG papers, suggest
that these leaders show an almost obsequious deference to Miss Chiang."^^ There was no
central, coordinated control of the diverse RG organizations, and local RG groups
functioned very much autonomously. But the authority under which RGs operated rested
in the government headed by Mao, and the voice of that government was that of JQ.
While she could not have directed or been aware o f all their actions in detail, she praised
the RGs "in their search o f bourgeois cultural remnants," and commended them, "you have
done an excellent job.
"Scholars had supposed that young people almost arbitrarily joined one or another
of the RG factions," wrote Anita Chan, Stanley Rosen, and Jonathan Unger. These
writers rejected this supposition, and argued that choices of joining a RG unit "were more
theoretically based in antagonisms over class issues, in high schools preceding the CR."^^
They traced RG membership to such issues as class tensions, and the lack o f future
opportunities. But RG groups were complex and diverse; one Cantonese worker
estimated that there had been eighty-five separate RG organizations in his factory, and that
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"the situation appeared as confusing to the Chinese as it did to the outside world.
Peggy Durdin, in The New York Times Magazine, reported that there were from "two to
twenty RG groups in each school, oflSce, and fectory."^'* In view o f this complexity, it is
doubtful that any choice of a RG unit was simply motivated.
The government, under the guise of promoting revolution, had many RG members
sent to work in the countryside. There, t h ^ were isolated and essentially imprisoned.
Forgotten by the government they believed they had served, they too became victims, as
real as those they had victimized.
Although no reliable figures on the number o f persons victimized during the CR
will ever be available, the numbers are so large as to lose meaning. Rodzinski estimated
that "A total o f729,000 people were 'fi-amed and persecuted,' of whom 34,900 were
'persecuted to death.'

Hoyt stated in even more general terms that "Before the CR

ended, 500 million people, or three-quarters o f the people of China, were sorely hurt and
millions were killed.

Accounts published later of personal hardships endured during

this time are called the "scar literature."
JQ had more than an advisory role as the early events of the CR unfolded. In
October, for instance, Zhou Enlai prohibited RG units in Beijing from going to Tibet. The
Chinese military "representative" in Tibet was General Zhang Guohua, who was allowing
local RG units there to proceed with the destruction o f the "four olds," but he was
apparently unhappy when t h ^ began to "bombard the headquarters," when those
headquarters were his own. JQ, however, authorized five youth groups to go there,
apparently with the purpose of forcing Zhang to be more loyal to Mao. When Zhou
ordered these units back to Beijing, JQ granted permission for them to stay, and JQ's
orders prevailed. She was not beneath enforcing her views in the face o f the highest
op positio n.Z hou Enlai was a voice of the "moderates"' throughout the CR, a position
which put him in opposition to JQ and other "radicals."
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JQ's rise in the CCP hierarchy paralleled to some extent that of her friend, Kang
Sheng, who was noted as having risen from 16th in line at the beginning of 1966 to 7th by
August of that year.^* Kang had held a number of

intelligence positions throughout

his career, but preferred a background role o f "advisor" to Mao. These positions included
heads of a "Social Aflfeirs Department," which overlooked internal security issues and
gave him control of secret service personnel, and of an "International Liaison
Department," which coordinated business with Communist organizations in other
countries, and controlled various police, security, espionage, and special agent groups.
His underlings were reportedly among the worse offenders o f cadres exhibiting high life
styles and bourgeousie tendencies. It is not clear to what extent they were targeted during
the revolution. He had the reputation of being Mao's "hatchet man," was thought of as
China's version of Russia's Beria, and was regarded as being ruthless and brutal. Much of
Mao's authority, Byron and Pack suggested, was due to the little publicized role of Kang's
strong-arm tactics. "It was Kang who ultimately decided the fate of most of the high
cadres hauled from their offices by the Red Guards.
In November of 1966, with the CR well under way, JQ's appointment as cultural
advisor to the PLA was confirmed. In commenting on this role, Xie Tang Zhong, a highranking official in the PLA cultural department, remarked that "Her appointment is an
important decision for strengthening the revolutionisation of our army's cultural work and
for making it more militant.

On this occasion. Time magazine used stronger language;

"She is now the deputy director of the CR's subcommittee and the sole advisor to the
PLA's purge group.

This appointment was more than simply honorary, as it gave JQ

censorship control of the arts and the enforcement authority o f the PLA.
JQ used this occasion to make a speech which summarized many of the
developments in the progress of the CR She mentioned her convalescence period of the
late 1950s as a time when she noticed "unacceptable ideas" in the theater, and formed the
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idea of merging culture and politics. She referred to "criminals" o f the Ministry of Culture
(who were the allies of Liu Shaoqi, but in the political style o f the time, they were
unnamed, so that everyone would worry), and emphasized the purgative aspects of the
arts. Her rhetorical questions regarding the necessity of rejecting classical art forms that
did not fit socialist ideological content was met with responses of "Yes! Yes!" fi"om the
audience. There were again reminders that Mao had provided a philosophical justification
for this transformation in culture in his Yanan essay of 1942, when he said that "There is
no such thing as art for art's sake, art that stands above classes or art that is detached fi'om
or independent of politics," and that the criterion by which to judge works of art lay in the
effects they had "on the masses in society."^^ "Hai Rui’s Dismissal" was mentioned with
disdain, and her model operas were extolled. At the end of her speech, she added that
"the struggle had to be conducted by reasoning and not by coercion or force. There must
be no beating of people."^^
But it was much too late for this much too little disclaimer. The admonition to
avoid violence, which was already well under way, was not taken seriously, as
perpetrators o f violence were not punished. JQ's rhetoric here paralleled the ambivalence
toward the use of violence that was present in the sixteen point directive of the Central
Committee o f the previous August. Had Mao or JQ been serious about curtailing RG
violence, the PLA would have been ordered to end it.
As an indicator of American perceptions of JQ at this time, Stuart Schram, writing
about this speech soon after it was given, called it "an obvious and depressing example of
a raucous and spiteful person enjoying her hour o f triumph over the party authorities who
have so long slighted her and finstrated her ambitions." But a few pages later, Schram
was referring to JQ as "gentle and retiring.

Kamow, too, noted the "increasing

prominence o f JQ" during this period, but saw her speechmaking role as one designed only
"to whip up radical enthusiasm.
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November 1966 was also the time when control of the Beijing arts groups was
transferred to a branch of the PLA. It was reported in the London Times that the PLA
had "taken over" the Beijing Opera companies, the Philharmonic orchestra, and the song
and dance ensemble "as a prelude to a new general offensive' against dissidents in
literature and the art."^^ Whke commented that this was comparable to the Pentagon
being put in charge o f the Metropolitan Opera Company.^^ But this abstract comparison
was not appropriate in the context o f the political scene of China, where culture, politics,
and military force were not so clearly delineated. The importance o f culture in the military
had a historical basis for the communists. At Yanan, the survivors o f the Long March
were military people, and theatrical productions there had a core o f army members.
"Every army had its own dramatic group," reported Edgar Snow.^*
In late November, Mao went on a trip to the Shanghai area and "JQ took the
center of the stage almost immediately after Mao's departure from Beijing.
HoUingworth added that in Mao's absence "JQ, acting on his orders, assumed a leading
role in the public direction of the CR.'"*® Mao was in fact and in theory Chairman of the
CCP, but he was leaving day-to-day operation o f the Party, and hence the government,
and hence the country, to others, and specifically to JQ.
Although the Beijing Communist Party Committee members had already been
removed from office, many of these leaders, including Peng Zhen, were arrested on
December 3. These leaders included men "who had dominated the stage and screen world
of Communist China," and were political opponents of Mao. They were to be struggled
against, denounced, and humiliated. Mao did not return to Beijing until early January,
1967. Rice's account of the nearly six-week period of Mao's absence included a virtual
day-by-day chronology of JQ's activity in directing RG actions, which included the first
struggle meeting of Liu's wife, Wang Guangmei."** JQ's animosity toward Wang
Guangmei was particularly intense. Wang was from a wealthy and sophisticated frmily.
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had appeared "on stage" at Tiananmen Square at the founding of the PRC in October of
1949, and was in many ways the person that JQ aspired to be.
In December o f 1966, JQ convened a forum, ostensibly for the purpose of
curtailing Red Guard attacks. But the result of the forum was to allow RG units to enter
into agricultural and manufacturing sectors o f society, in violation of the original sixteen
point program of the previous August. JQ and Chen Boda both urged seizure of the
CCP's main labor organization, the All-China Federation of Trade Unions.'*^ Kamow
attributed these orders to "the Maoists," not Mao himself. The policies were those of
Mao, but Mao was adopting a less visible role in their advocacy. As the CR progressed, it
was JQ who was the more visible spokesperson of the Maoist views.
Some workers, having for years been ill-treated and neglected by their local work
unit cadres, took advantage of the tumultuous times to present their grievances. JQ
publicly received the petitions of a group of workers on December 25, 1966. She belittled
Xi Zhanyuan, a vice-minister of labor and the subject of these grievances: "The Ministry
of Labor is simply a Ministry of Lords," she charged, bursting into tears (undoubtedly for
dramatic effect) at governmental indifference to the workers' plight.'*^
In January o f 1967, a group of radical students from Beijing took control of
Shanghai radio and TV stations and denounced "economism," a term which referred to
activities such as offering workers economic and material incentives for increased
productivity, work slowdowns, and payoffs to workers for support against invading RGs.
Economism in this sense was seen as an appeal to short-term individual interests, rather
than long-term group goals, and so was contrary to the new thinking of the CR. Normal
urban activities in Shanghai ceased: utility services were disrupted, transportation was
halted, factory production ended and a "new" government was created by the RG leaders.
General chaos resulted. After earlier praising these leaders for their accomplishments in
ousting the established cadres, Mao had to admonish them for advocating what amounted
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to anarchism when events of the revolution became uncontrollable.'*'* This was one
indication that Mao was attempting to distance himself from accesses of the CR, while of
course continuing to reap political benefits. And on January 23, 1967, the PLA was
authorized to support the Maoist rebel groups. "Army intervention in the CR was the
major factor in shifting the balance of power in China's internal power struggle . . . in
favor o f the Maoist leftists. "45
Mao is often quoted as having said that a revolution is not a picnic. The CR was
to be no exception to this rule. Victims and casualties, even numbering in the hundreds of
thousands, had to be expected, as in any revolution. JQ told Witke: "the battles were not
good of themselves because they engendered loss of life and property. But at the same
time they clarified contradictions between classes and promoted ideological and cultural
transformations that were beneficial in the long run.'"*® She was not the first political
leader to use ends to justify means. Even Mao himself was not completely happy with
JQ's activity. On February 10, 1967, at a meeting of the Standing Committee, he "severely
reprimanded" Chen Boda, and then JQ: "You, JQ, have high-flown aims but little ability.
You're ambitious but incompetent. You look down on everyone else." JQ diverted this
attack "entirely onto Chen," and to such a degree that "Kang Sheng claimed, 'She's forcing
Boda to the verge o f suicide." Later, she "pointed at Chen's nose and challenged "Go
ahead and commit suicide. Go ahead! Youll be expelled from the party and called a
traitor. Do you have the courage to commit suicide?" This was her attitude toward
Chen, who, it will be recalled, was one of her allies. Wang added, in characteristic
Chinese understatement, that the Cultural Revolution Group "was certainly not a solid
bloc.'"*^ The transactions of some of these meetings illustrated Terrill's observation that
"personal grudges made playthings o f policy isssues.'"** JQ's grudges, and the strength of
her personality, aflfected Chinese politics for ten years.
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On April 4, JQ addressed student activists in Beijing, and explained that it was the
duty of the PLA to support radical factions. She repeated this message on April 10 to the
Military Affairs Committee, China's highest Army Council. These were attempts to
restore peace between warring PLA and RG units. Kamow also quoted JQ as saying in
April 1967: "There caimot be peaceful coexistence in the ideological realm. Peaceful
coexistence corrupts.'"*^ This phraseology went beyond the usual political rhetoric and
exhortations ascribed to JQ. Here, she was uttering political and philosophical theory,
albeit theory of an easy, general nature. Perhaps these words were those of Yao
Wenyuan, the gifted writer who had collaborated with her in composing the initial critique
of Wu Han.
These speeches were more than just occasions for JQ to encourage RG forces to
continue their course of "re-education." They presented situations in which she could
announce policy. "During the 1st and 2nd quarter of 1967, the radical faction led by JQ
had been dominant in the Maoist policy-making council in Beijing."®® JQ's speeches
carried the full weight of the Politburo, of which she was a determining factor. In May,
she presided over a Beijing rally commemorating the 25th anniversary of Mao's Yanan
talks.
Also in May, 1967, a meeting was held in Beijing to appoint General Zhang
Guohua, the military commander in Tibet, as head of a Revolutionary Committee
governing neighboring Sichuan Province. Kamow recorded that JQ advised Zhang that
the army's role there was to "minimize internal strife," which meant, in this context, that
Zhang was to unify elements sympathetic to Mao and "subdue" his opponents. Zhang's
loyalties may have been suspect, since he came, like Deng Xiaoping, from that province.
At a later conference on Sichuan, in March, 1968, JQ accused General Zhang
"mercilessly" of having foiled to properly promote the CR there, and asserted that "We
don't know where your sympathies lie."®* Kamow's comments revealed both that JQ was
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a regular participant in meetings of this sort, and that she was not a silent participant. And
she did not hesitate to berate generals for political shortcomings.
In recorded accounts of this period, fewer and fewer pronouncements of Mao are
found, and more and more proclamations o f "Maoists," who were JQ and her "clique."
Elegant, however, overstated the case when he claimed that "the Chairman had not made a
single public statement during the entire revolution."®^
In a speech on April 13, JQ revealed that she had acted as "a roving sentinel for
Mao, observing events in culture, education, and international affairs."®® In this way, JQ
was also gaining experience and knowledge for herself. At a July 22 RG rally, she
repeated the token advice that RGs were to attack by words, but defend by force.®** As
RG rampages were widespread at this time, her feeble advice for them to "defend by
force" was just more rhetorical camouflage similar to the way government officials refer to
military forces as being based in a "Ministry of Defense."
A more serious point of difference between JQ and Mao arose in June of this year.
Wang reported that Mao was opposed to the use of force in the CR: "Ever since seizure
of power broke out, he [Mao] had ceaselessly opposed armed struggle, assault, and
looting.. .. The Chairman also opposed "kangaroo courts;' he instructed members o f the
Cultural Revolution Group to investigate and dissolve all such courts wherever they were
found and to release all victims." Much of this talk was apparently simple political
verbiage, as kangaroo courts continued and victims were not released. But in June, even
Mao's rhetoric changed. "If the Chairman had held on to this idea [of minimizing
violence], the CR would not have had such serious repercussions. The fact was that he
later began to think about it from another side."®® Wang did not add the obvious
conclusion that it was on JQ's advice that Mao thought about the other side.
The most notable example of PLA reaction to RG actions occurred in the city of
Wuhan in July o f this year, 1967. In this incident, local PLA forces refused to yield to RG
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demands, and their resistance led to armed conflict and bloodshed. JQ used this incident
to blame army elements for CR failures, thereby allowing army cadres to become targets
o f RG sanctions.®® Byron and Peck wrote that Lin Biao actually had limited authority in
controlling the vast PLA, and that "tough provincial commanders," reacting to events at
local levels, were able to put down RG activities. On July 25, with Mao again absent from
Beijing, JQ and Kang Sheng, during a Tiananmen Square RG rally, instructed RG leaders
to "drag out capitalist roaders and counter-revolutionaries in the army" and to spread this
information as coming from Mao (but in fact Mao did not approve of RG assaults on the
PLA).®^ In this instance, the radicals adopted belligerent and inflammatory language:
arms were to be used to defend the CR with "life and blood." With regard to the
interpretation o f this language, "Nobody encouraged the revival of violence more openly
than did Mao's wife, Jiang Qing."®* The alliance of JQ and Lin Biao through the PLA,
while perhaps never firm, had proved to be short lived. Hoyt attributed more grandiose
aspirations to this pair: "What Mao did not know was that his wife and Lin Biao .. . had
decided to take power in China."®®
In August, JQ and Lin Biao initiated attacks on cadres of the Foreign Ministry,
designed "to embarrass the Chinese government with foreign powers."®® A former RG
member identified by Butterfield as "Lo" was later accused of being a member of an ultra
radical group that took over this ministry. Lo claimed that "his group followed direct
orders from JQ."®* The purpose of these attacks would be puzzling until it is realized that
Zhou Enlai had assumed responsibility for this Ministiy the previous April. Foreign
relations had been "paralyzed" (Kamow's word) throughout the CR, and these attacks
were designed to reduce further Zhou's authority and prestige. The attacks expanded to
include assaults on "diplomats of almost every foreign mission" in Beijing, and included
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the burning of the British embassy.®^ The Chinese government, in an effort to regain loss
o f international prestige arising from these incidents, later tried and imprisoned at least one
Chinese diplomat for these actions.®®
In early August, JQ "denounced the 5/16 (May 16th) group," presumably a semisecret terrorist organization which was alleged to have instigated this burning, and was
believed by some to be under the control o f Lin Biao.®** This speech illustrated as well
that JQ had no reticence about publicly criticizing Lin, although they were still included
together as part of "the radical faction." JQ, Chen Boda, and Kang Sheng all spoke at a
Beijing Municipal Party Committee meeting on September 1, and continued to blame the
5/16 clique for counter-revolutionary activity. At this time, Zhou Enlai denied the
importance of this group; "Dont magnify the question of the May 16th elements. It's not
a big problem, only a question of some bad leaders."®®
On September 5, JQ made an important speech, representing Mao's views to a
large meeting of delegates from Anhui province. She explained that her speech was given
extemporaneously, claiming that Kang Sheng had dragged her there at the last moment. If
that was true, the speech testified to JQ's ability to speak at length and on short notice on
issues o f the CR. The record of the speech showed that she was interrupted at one time
by comments from Yao Wenyuan, who was also in attendance. In this speech, JQ claimed
that she was opposed to armed struggle, and again attacked the May 16th clique, which
she linked to spies of the United States, Russia, and even Chiang Kai-Shek.®® She urged
the RGs to show some respect to the PLA, a view which may have been a reflection of
Mao's realization that the violence of the RGs was not producing beneficial results. This
speech came at a time when the PLA was beginning to take an active role in suppressing
RG excesses. Further major speeches followed on September 14 and 15, to new
propaganda teams o f workers and soldiers, and in which she made some attempts to tone
down CR violence and blame what violence there was on Chen Boda.®^
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A speech at a Beijing forum on literature and art in November provided a revealing
insight into JQ's thinking. There, she spoke ominously of "accounts must be settled for
the fifty days, for the seventeen years, and for the nineteen thirties as well."®* These
accounts were for actions performed by Liu Shaoqi fi'om May to July, 1966, when Liu
sent CR work teams to Universities, and which teams she viewed as having protected
"dissident elements." The accounts to be settled also included transgressions of Mao's
opponents for the entire period from 1949 to 1966, and even back to the 1930s, during the
early years of struggle within the Party and against the forces of the GMD. Revenge
against real or imagined wrongs o f the past was a motive for many of JQ's vindictive
actions. %a Yan, a former boss o f hers in Shanghai, and other Shanghai filmmakers, were
humiliated and struggled against. X a had once given a role that she (as Lan Ping)
wanted to someone else. These men were accused, thirty years later, of political
deviations "recently uncovered."®® JQ's memory o f past grievances was long, indeed.
In promoting idealistic aspects o f the CR, JQ emphasized self-criticism, and an
inward struggle to purify thought. "We are prosecuting two revolutions . . . one to reform
the objective world and one to reform the subjective world.. . . Only when power is
thoroughly seized from the Ego in the mind will it be possible to insure a complete victory
in the struggle to seize power from the power holders who take the capitalist road."^®
This was a reaflBrmation of the idea that the CR was to be based on a complete revolution
in human thinking, and that human minds had to be purged of thoughts of self-interest.
A second issue emphasized by JQ during the CR was the idea that people learn to
do by doing. This was a repetition of one of Mao's themes, which was phrased as "we
leam to swim by swimming." Given the future goal of a pure communist society, it may
not be clear what steps will lead to that goal. So the CR became in some respects an
experimentation with different means to attain that end; it was of no consequence that
innocent people, or hundreds of thousands of innocent people, suffered in the process of
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reaching this higher good. The CR was the result of uniting this particular type of political
single-minded thinking with an artistic and cultural emphasis.
There was a sense at this time that no one was in control in China. Elegant,
speaking of the formal government, wrote that "China entered the winter of 1967-68
devoid of even the pretense of a functioning central authority," and that "central power
had been virtually destroyed in China by April, 1969. The Communist Party had been
shattered, and the People's Government was the gaping facade of a gutted edifice."^* An
Tai Sung stated that for the years 1967-72, "the PLA was running China,
so that some semblance of order was maintained.
Meanwhile, JQ continued to make speeches. In January, 1968, she, Chen Boda,
Kang Sheng, Yao Wenyuan and Zhou Enlai addressed an "important seminar" held for
representatives from Hunan Province, which was designed to establish a Hunan Provincial
Revolutionary Committee.^® Zhou was a master of diplomacy, and maintained his difficult
position throughout this chaotic time. On March 27, JQ addressed PLA cadres.
Ostensibly, she was to explain "the process o f recognizing double-dealers," but her speech
was another attack on "traitors," who were this time the leaders of the "February Adverse
Current." This was the five-member CR Group which had been headed by Peng Zhen.®**
In the May Day celebration in Beijing, she was observed as being "in the 9th leadership
position, up from 19th in October of 1967."^® It was in 1968 that the popular slogan
"leam from Jiang Qing" appeared throughout China. She was accepted as a political
authority by the Chinese people, and it was in 1968 that she reached the peak of her public
prominence.
Kamow wrote that JQ had become disenchanted with the course of the CR in early
1968, and indeed she made few public speeches advocating CR reforms after that time.
Perhaps the political fervor of the movement had simple bumed out, although the CR was
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far from over, and RG and PLA units continued their numerous violent encounters. But
on July 27, Mao, tearfully, it is reported, "in an attempt to destroy the monster he had
invented, repudiated the Red Guards," because they had failed to unite and their persistent
fighting was ruining the country.^®
JQ's declining enthusiasm with the CR may have coincided with Mao's own. But
while her speechmaking diminished, her political activity did not. Vice Premier Li FuChang, who was aligned with Zhou Enlai, was one object of attack. After this
confrontation, JQ had "scored a victory," and she "soon began to appear on public
occasions in the fifth place that Li Fu-chang had previously occupied." On June 24, Nie
Changzhen, another vice premier and Chairman of the Scientific and Technolo^cal
Commission, was attacked in a wall poster written by JQ's daughter, Li Min.^^ Nie was
aligned with Beijing mayor Peng Zhen, and a fiiend of Fan Jin, who had replaced JQ as Yu
Qiwei's lover in the 1930s.
On September 6 of 1968, the People's Daily declared a "decisive nationwide
victory" in the CR. Indeed, early Western accounts of the CR contained such phrases as
"by the time the CR began winding down in 1968."^* For these writers, the period of the
CR was 1966-68. But in April of 1969, at the Ninth Party Congress, when Madame
Mao was appointed to the Politburo, the themes of the CR were adopted as continuing
national policy, and later historians dated the end of the CR with Mao's death in 1976.
The day after her Politburo appointment, JQ made an impromptu speech at a rally
celebrating formation of provincial revolutionary committees throughout China, in which
she commended the RGs, urged workers not to repress them, and added "I am saying this
on Chairman Mao's authority."^®
Under JQ's direction, the effects o f the CR were felt across all aspects o f Chinese
society. Richard Kraus commented that established artists, not yet adjusted to the new
political realities, found it easier to remain idle during this period rather than to run the
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risk of facing political disfavor.*® The effect on academic thinking and research was
equally stifling. At the time of the subsequent trials o f the Gang of Four, it was mentioned
that the study of city planning ceased, as it "served the urban landlords," and the studies of
finance, banking and accounting were tainted as "putting money first;. . . research in our
Institute of Economics was disrupted for more than a decade and the enthusiasm of our
comrades was greatly dampened. People still fear and tremble."** Frederick Wakeman
Jr., a prominent Mao scholar, visited China soon after Mao's death. In discussions with
representatives of China's Institute of History of the Academy of Social Sciences, he
reported one member as saying "Under the domination of Chiang Ch'ing [JQ] and Chung
Ch'un-ch'iao [Zhang Chunqiao] there had been no opportunity for scholarly debate. If
Chiang Ch'ing had felt that one particular historical interpretation or fact was correct, then
no other viewpoint was tolerated."*^ Wakeman's point was that Chinese historians were
subject to political control during the CR, but he incidentally verified that it was JQ who
was responsible for that control.
American writer Harrison Salisbury spoke with History Professor Chun Hsi-chang
o f Fu Dan University in 1976. Chun recalled an incident when "orders came down fi'om
the party for research about a 19th century Prime Minister, Li Hung-chang" which was to
be used as an attack on Zhou Enlai. It had to be written "according to the new formula
laid down by Miss Chiang and her associates for historical writing: 70% fact and 30%
imagination," although sometimes, the professor added, the percentages were reversed.
Salisbury recorded that "No feature films whatever were produced in China fi'om 1966 to
1973." He wrote that "writers, composers, poets, artists are now beginning to emerge
fi'om the shadows," and referred to "the nonpresence o f writers and artists" that he had
found there on a previous trip to China in 1972.*®
Another methodology of CR leaders, illustrating the policy of "putting politics
first," was made explicit at the time of the trials of the Gang of Four: "Data must be
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obtained with the needs o f the struggle in mind and not for its own sake."*** This was in
effect the grim political realization of the Western joke about fitting facts to conform to
theory. The Cambridge History of China, in its Bibliographical Essays, stated that during
this period, "few new books appeared, virtually all specialized journals ceased
publication."*® JQ's influence was felt on the superstructure as well as the base of
society.
By the end of 1968, much of the violence against civilians had ended. RG and
PLA Actions continued fighting, but the CR entered a new phase. And JQ was to pursue
yet another more ambitious objective.

In the Wings: 1969-76

At the Ninth Congress o f the CCP (April, 1969), JQ, Zhang Chunqiao and Yao
Wenyuan were elected to the Politburo. Writing of her career at that time. Professor An
stated that "She is by far the most powerful woman in China, soaring within three
years fi-om total obscurity to a seat in the Party Politburo." Her importance was
emphasized, when An added "She has exercised authority second only to her husband in
the past three years."*®
The new Standing Committee of the Politburo consisted of five men: Mao, Zhou
Enlai, Chen Boda, Kang Sheng, and Lin Biao. At that time, these five were the most
powerful in China, the world's most populous country. How striking it is that JQ had
close connections with each of these five: she was married to Mao, and a childhood fiiend
of Kang Sheng. Although she was politically aligned with Chen Boda and other
"radicals," she had dismissed Chen as being "weak," although he was among the most
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loyal of Mao’s supporters. She had feuded with the moderate, Zhou Enlai, whom she
regarded as opposed to the aggressive policies o f Mao's government, and was quarreling
with Lin, who was selected by Mao at this Ninth Congress to be his successor as party
chairman. JQ herself desired to be Mao's successor, and animosity between JQ and Lin
Biao intensified over this issue.
Zhou Enlai gave the keynote address on October 1, 1969, in a celebration marking
the 20th anniversary of the founding of the People's Republic. The fact that this speech
was given by the moderate, Zhou, indicated a decline in the visible power of the radicals.
The excesses of the CR began to be blamed on those who were "too radical" Some RG
members were held accountable for their crimes, and some over-zealous party activists
were purged as they had purged unto others. Chen Boda was one leader of the highest
rank who was discredited. He was accused of "ultra-leftist'' inclinations, and lost political
importance. And JQ, while removed fi'om the spotlight, remained busy in the wings.
For one thing, she was again active in cultural affairs. The New York Times
reported that she was in charge of revising the model operas, which began to show "more
emphasis on selflessness for the sake of the masses and on discipline than in the earlier
revisions."** The new emphasis was designed for a time of "internal consolidation and
external threat," rather than (as in the earlier revisions) a time o f struggle for political
power. She introduced no new model operas. Having tasted higher powers, perhaps she
could not return to the less ambitious activity of artistic creation. Or, she and her public
may have just become tired of the same operatic themes.
For another thing, JQ was not absent fi'om the political arena. Newsweek had
written of her supposed demise in 1968; "At the frenzied pinnacle of China's Cultural
Revolution, a single word fi'om Chiang Ching - the dowdy, demoniacal wife of Mao Tsetung - was enough to make strong men tremble .. . Recently, Chiang Ching has held her
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tongue. . . they [the radicals] have been consigned to political oblivion."*® Two years
later, Newsweek presented a revised opinion. After noting that "neither the Cultural
Revolution nor the internal struggle for control had run their course," Newsweek
continued: "Still more interesting to China watchers was the re-emergence into the
political fray of Chiang Ching, the wife o f party Chairman Mao Tse-tung, and, as a
member of the Politburo, China's leading voice of cultural affairs." Having reinforced the
preconceptions of JQ as "Mao's wife" and as important for "cultural affairs" (views
attributed to unnamed "China watchers"), Newsweek provided an insight indicating
worldwide adoption of her radical ideas; "Mao's statement of May 20 [1970], extolling
the atmosphere of world revolution - [is] in line with the more militant views being
attributed to Chiang Ching and her followers."®®
The Witke interviews were conducted in August of 1972. It might be supposed
that an account of JQ's accomplishments in the years 1970-72 would form an important
part of this unofficial biography. However, Witke's account only briefly mentioned this
period. In fact, one major activity of JQ during this time was the denunciation o f Lin
Biao, who was no longer alive, and his supporters, many of whom were very much alive.
The circumstances surrounding Lin's death formed an incident of major importance for the
Chinese political scene and for JQ's future.
Public information about this incident was not quickly available. The Chinese
government on January 13, 1972, announced to party officials that Lin, with his wife and
son, had died in a plane crash near the Soviet border in September of 1971. But it was not
until June 26 of 1972 that details of an official version of his death were released.®* The
government also announced that there was irrefutable evidence that Lin and his son had
plotted, with others, assassination attempts against Mao. The delay in publicizing the
event, however, aroused suspicions about the facts of the case. The scenario presented by
the government was that after the plots were discovered, Lin died, accidentally and
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incidentally, in an attempt to flee the country. Although Lin had been designated as Mao's
successor in 1969, he and Mao had a "confi'ontation" at a conference in Lushan in late
August of 1970, and t h ^ had feuded openly ever since.
Previously, JQ had perhaps flimsy reasons to disapprove of Lin, and her attacks
were of a milder nature. For instance, eleven photos taken by JQ appeared in China
Pictorial, a Teking propaganda magazine," in August of 1971. These included a picture
of Lin without his hat on, showing a clearly bald head, "a subject about which he was
sensitive."®^ Such an action was a deliberate attempt to embarrass and discredit Lin.
But the uncovering of these plots revealed Lin as a traitor, and he and the
mysterious May 16th clique that was reputedly under his control came to be blamed for
the evils of the CR. Past points of disagreement between Lin and Mao, or Lin and JQ,
now became issues signifying early signs of treachery, and were traced back many years.
Lin was alleged, for instance, to have undermined JQ's efforts at film production in the
early 1960s. No doubt delighting in the task, and now with a certified villain to attack,
and a dead villain at that, JQ became a chief designer of a campaign to expose and
discredit Lin. Wherever the facts of responsibility for excesses and evils of the CR may
have rested, Lin and his followers became easy scapegoats. In fact, at its strongest, the
5/16 group was never of much importance and had few members, although thousands of
individuals were purged and persecuted because of alleged allegiance to this largely
fictitious organization. Dietrich referred to this group as "possibly nonexistent."
Bamouin claimed that "In the late 1970s, it was officially admitted that the group was an
invention." And Terrill stated bluntly "Yes, JQ faked the truth about Lin Biao," referring
to her accusations that Lin had tried to poison her, and that he had instructed film
laboratories to sabotage her movies.®®
Lin's death in 1971 came at a time when relations between China and the United
States were unexpectedly becoming fiiendlier, with the result that then President of the
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United States Richard Nixon visited China in February, 1972. At the time of this visit, JQ
was acting as spokesperson of communist ideas. At a performance of the opera "Red
Detachment of Women," Nixon asked her for the names o f the writer, composer, and
director, and was told that the work was "created by the masses," affirming the party
doctrine that groups, not individuals, were the creative forces of artistic achievement.®**
She was also involved in the visit to China (Shanghai and Beijing) by the Philadelphia
Orchestra in September of 1973, and whose music she attacked, in the Spring of 1974, as
being "bougeois."®® These American visits to China also indicated a diminished role of the
radical faction in determining foreign policy. "The Politburo members in the extremist
faction, JQ, wife of Mr. Mao, and Kang Sheng, who had been concerned with security
matters, seem to have lost some influence. A third, Chen Boda, formerly Mr. Mao's
secretary, had not been seen publicly since /Wgust, 1970," recorded newsman Seymour
Topping.®® In September of 1974, Imelda Marcos, at that time wife o f Philippines'
President Fernando Marcos, visited China and was hosted there by JQ. The two women
toured Xiaojinzhuang, which had been designed by JQ as a "tiny utopian proletarian
culture" with about six hundred peasants.®®
The anti-Lin campaign became aligned with another anti-campaign, this one
against Confucius, at the Tenth Party Congress in August of 1973. JQ chaired the
committee organized to head the campaign to criticize these two.®* There were again
references to the party being under the control of "the JQ faction."®® In the People's Daily
of August 7, Confucius was referred to as "the thinker who stubbornly defends the system
of slavery."*®® A combined Lin and Confucius attack lacked a common link, as Lin had
no strong Conflician background. But the Confucian ethic severely restricted roles of
women in society, and those roles precluded the opportunity for them to govern. Seizing
on the obvious vulnerability of Lin, and seeking to prepare a way for acceptance of a
woman ruler in China, the opportunity to combine the two campaigns was irresistible.
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It was widely understood, however, that the real target of this campaign was Zhou
Enlai.*®* This campaign was analyzed by Frederick Wakeman, who decided that it was
turned into "a movement to study the history of the struggle between Legalists and
Confucians. This 'meticulously plotted trick' had been directed by Chiang Ch'ing. . .
because she dared not name her real enemy, who was Chou En-Lai." *®® This revealing
article indicated not only that Wakeman assumed that JQ and 2%ou Enlai were "enemies,"
but also that he attributed to JQ considerable political expertise. As Wu Han had
indirectly attacked Mao through the use o f Hai Rui, so JQ took this indirect method of
attacking Zhou Enlai.
In 1971 and 1972, JQ was busy with other plans which she did not reveal to
Witke. In April o f 1971, Mao had ordered the establishment of a central propaganda
group, "a powerful organ controlling ideology, cultural, and propaganda activities."*®®
This group was headed by Kang Shang, and included JQ. This propaganda machine was
engaged in researching precedents o f women rulers in China, and presenting histories of
these rulers for public distribution. The purpose, of course, was to prepare the Chinese
people for JQ's assumption o f Mao's leadership position. Wu Zetian (of the Tang dynasty,
8th century) had ruled China for fifty years, and Empress Lu of the Han dynasty had ruled
for sixteen. More recently, the Dowager Empress Ci Xi (1850-1908) had ruled for fortyeight years at the end of the Qing dynasty (1644-1911). Disregarding the early CR notion
that "old traditions" were to be rejected, and relying now on those traditions to establish
authority, a nationwide publicity campaign was launched to legitimize the notion of a
female head of state. As Kang became incapacitated because of illness, control of this
operation passed directly to JQ in May o f 1974. *®** HoUingworth acknowledged this
transfer of power: "Throughout 1974 and 1975, diplomats and correspondents based in
Peking realized that the media [were] under the direction of JQ."*®® While visiting China
as part of the "ping-pong diplomacy" thaw in U.S.-China relations, James Reston sought
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information about this agency, but "we were not, oddly enough, able to get at the
propaganda apparatus. It is a fontastic apparatus, centered somewhere in the Central
Committee, with the primary voice of it being the People’s Daily in Beijing." *®® What was
odd here was that Reston thought the prevention of his inquiries into this agency was odd.
Not long after Lin's death, Mao began to disparage JQ publicly, referring to her
"wild ambition and general incompetence."*®® Mao also objected to JQ's 1972 interviews
with Witke, which he viewed as simply a means of self-promotion and glorification. In
July, 1974 and May, 1975, Mao also publicly objected to the "Gang o f Four" (Mao's own
phrase), and warned JQ against forming cliques. In December of 1974, he spoke directly
to JQ: "Dont form a faction. Those who form factions will fall down."*®* Other writers
had noted the emergence of a quartet involving JQ. Hoyt stated that the Gang of Four
was forming a visible group at this time.*®® And Zhao Yanqi (pseudonym), who had been
asked to write an "official" account of Lin Biao's death, referred (in 1973) to the Gang of
Four as "rapidly rising." **® A letter from JQ to Mao dated November 12, 1974, was
returned to her with a marginal note advising her "not to make many public
appearances, not to approve documents, and not to organize a cabinet or act like a back
stage boss."*** Mao, too, used theatrical terminology when referring to JQ's career.
Due, perhaps, to Mao's admonition for her to refrain from public appearances,
there is little record o f her activities in 1975. In one speech in March o f that year, an
Address to Diplomatic Cadres, she represented herself as relaying messages from Mao:
"The pith and soul of Marxist-Leninism-Mao Tse-Tung thought are adherence to the
doctrine of class struggle and the implementation of the proletarian dictatorship."* *® She
spoke at that time o f a world-wide victory for Communism, and made suggestions about
the proper conduct for Chinese diplomats stationed in other countries. In a letter to an
agricultural conference dated July 2, 1975, she repeated the idea that the way to solve
problems was "to arm our leadership with the theories of Marxism."* *®
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But she did make one "important speech" at a national conference on "Learning
from Dazhai in Agriculture," in early September, 1975. She urged "a gradual return to the
original organizational concept for the communes, as t h ^ had been developed in 1958"
and for "poor and lower-middle class peasants to continue to wage class struggle in the
villages." She could not resist, perhaps, blaming China's agricultural problems on an old
foe, Liu Shaoqi. **** Her recommendations were in opposition to those proposed by Hua
Guofeng, who in a year's time was to succeed Mao. In an ironic sequel to this conference,
a "Second National Conference on Learning from Dazai in Agriculture” was held in
December of 1976. It was addressed by Hua Guofeng and he urged a policy of
moderation toward the then recently arrested Gang of Four. His comments indicated the
dilemma facing the party; "Take JQ for example, after all, she was Chairman Mao's wife.
No matter what outrageous crimes she committed, if we deal with her in the extreme, it
would have implications for Chairman Mao, which would be harmful to the cause of the
Party."**® The problem facing Mao's successors would be to find a way to condemn
Mao's wife, and yet spare Mao.
After Lin Biao's death, the dominant Communist leader besides Mao was Zhou
Enlai. Several instances of friction between JQ and Zhou have been recorded here. This
friction, initiated by JQ, was part of her plan to achieve sole leadership of the communist
party. While her activities in 1975 were curtailed, she continued feuding with both Zhou
and Deng Xiaoping. Hua Guofeng who did not have the political support structure that
Deng (thanks to Liu) had, was apparently not important enough for her to combat.
But the publicity effort was not forgotten. "She continued to orchestrate a
campaign to set herself up as Mao's successor," using publicity provided by control of
news media. **® In a quotation provided by Witke, although occurring four years after her
interviews, but before Mao's death, JQ claimed that "The man must abdicate and let the
woman take over. . . . Even under Communism, there can still be an empress." This
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publicity campaign was successful to the extent that "JQ's reputation soared in the 611 of
1974, and into the next spring, and so did those of empresses."

And, in a desperate

attempt to lay claim to Mao's position, JQ was alleged to have forged and altered
documents to prove that Mao had named her as his successor. ^

There was evidence to

support this claim, which became one o f the issues at her trial as a member, indeed leader,
of the Gang of Four.
Throughout the CR, JQ's attacks on individual, successful women were
particularly noteworthy. She insured the public trial and humiliation of Fan Jin, who had
become editor of the Beijing Daily News, and who many years before had replaced her in
Yu Qiwei's favor. Xu Guangping, wife of Lu Xun, "the twentieth century's greatest
protest writer and a man whom she idolized," was persecuted and eventually died. Why?
"It was an aftereffect of the literary struggle between Zhou Yang and Lu Xun during the
middle 1930s," she glibly explained.

Sun Weishi, "a very bright and innovative woman

theatrical director, and an adopted daughter of Zhou Enlai, was imprisoned and tortured
to death in 1968, in Qin Cheng Number One, a secret prison in a suburb of Beijing.
Butterfield suggested that Sun's imprisonment was simply professional jealousy on the part
of JQ, but it may also have been motivated by JQ's continuing enmity with Zhou. Even
Zhou's high-ranking position was not enough to save his daughter fi'om this fate.
Other women of ability and reputation fared no better. Ding Ling had supervised
political education, edited records o f the Long March, and taught literature while in
Yanan. While there, she was known as "a trailbreaker in every field, particularly in the
emancipation of women."

She had ridiculed the CCP leadership over hypocrisy

regarding their talk about equality for women and their actual treatment of women, and
antagonized JQ over the issue of her marriage to Mao.

She had been imprisoned by the

GMD and again by the Communist government during the anti-rightist movement after the
Hundred Flowers campaign. JQ showed her no sympathy, and she was imprisoned yet
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again, for five years, in April of 1970. One other female cadre and CCP member, Zhang
Zhixin, who spoke out against the Gang of Four and became a cult hero, claimed that JQ
was a destroyer of China's culture and literature. Zhang was arrested, tortured, and
executed by having her throat slit, in April of 1975.
Much o f JQ's venom was reserved for Wang Guangmei, wife of Mao's political
rival Liu Shaoqi, and toward whom she was engaged in a personal "vendetta.

As

wife of China's Chief of State, she was for many years China's "First Lady" and was also
politically active. She was "struggled against" and publicly humiliated on several
occasions. Three years earlier, she had asked JQ's opinion about the propriety of wearing
a necklace on a state visit to Indonesia. Against JQ's advice, she wore the necklace.
Antagonism between JQ and Wang Guangmei ran deep; JQ regarded Wang as a poor
representative of communism, and Wang may have been jealous o f JQ's rising status.
Numerous other wives o f renounced communist leaders, as well as their families, became
JQ's victims. JQ "insisted that every time an ofiScial was purged, his wife also be
f e U e d ." l2 6

Women did not form a significant portion of political leaders in China, or in any of
the important sectors of Chinese life. Perhaps inhibited by the culture of the Confucian
ethic, or just simple prejudice, a woman leader in any field was a rare occurrence. Fox
Butterfield reported (in 1982) "a great leap forward of human dignity that Chinese women
have made since 1949." But although one-third of China's scientists and engineers were
female, 80% of farm field work was done by women, and old assumptions about male
superiority and feminine inferiority remained. Butterfield concluded that "the CR had no
immediate effect of the status of women."

Terrill concurred with the unimportance of

JQ's achievements in support of feminism: "Playing the sex-and-power game meant,
indeed, turning one's back on women's solidarity... . The game JQ was playing could
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only be played on her own behalf, not for the cause of women in general."

Peggie

Thom Vannozzi concluded that the feminism of the revolutionary operas merely
"reaflBrmed traditional sex roles.

Given JQ's opportunities, she could have

acomplished much more in the advancement of feminist causes.
Zhou Enlai's death in January, 1976, presented an opportunity for JQ "After the
Premier’s heart attack, JQ assumed an ever increasing role,. . . because she had automatic
access to the Chairman's bedroom and study." Mao himself had been in ill health for
several years, and was virtually incapacitated at this time, and it is not clear how much
governmental business was conducted between Zhou's death in January and Mao's death in
September. But, "'inside people' claimed that it was JQ who personally prevented him
[Mao] from attending any o f the sad celebrations that marked the Premier's lying in
state.

At Zhou's funeral, JQ angered many Chinese by refusing to remove her hat, a

sign of disrespect, and her popularity was in decline. In April of that year, public support
of the memory of Zhou led to a spontaneous Tiananmen Square demonstration. When the
government removed wreaths brought to honor Zhou, thousands of Chinese protested
repression and injustice. Kamow claimed that the crowds were disbursed at JQ's
command, although she was later to deny this.
The personal relation between Mao and Madame Mao, about which it would be
difficult to obtain reliable information, has not been carefully documented. Butterfield
reported an unnamed member of Mao's family as saying that JQ and Mao stopped living
together as husband and wife as eariy as 1949, and that "Mao couldn't stand her. All her
n a g ^ g and ambitions.

This was not a topic about which JQ confided any details to

Witke, while Terrill stated simply, "In the 1960s, the marriage r e v i v e d . " T o w a r d the
end of his life, Mao and JQ entered yet another phase of their relationship. As a sign of
trust between the two, she "was the only person who could use the Chairman's chop
(seal), which is more important than a signature in China," and "The relations between
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Mao and his wife were, in fact, the unspoken but major problem of all those Chinese
ministers responsible for both foreign and domestic policy roughly from the end of the
Tenth Party Conference in August 1973 until Premier Zhou's [Enlai] death early in January
1976."^^'^ It is not the intent of this thesis to document the personal relationship between
Mao and Madame Mao. It should be noted, however, that this relationship and the
perception of it by high CCP officials had an effect on events and policies o f the CR.
Hidden behind the public image o f the actress Lan Ping was the real person, JQ.
Before the CR, she could use her influence to make demands and give orders to directors,
producers, or arts' personnel. These demands and orders may or may not have been
followed, but with her increased political power, she could and did enforce her wishes by
having dissenters arrested or otherwise harassed. Terrill observed correctly that "Had she
not been Mao's wife, JQ would have been a perfect target of the CR."^^^ This could be
true, given her lifestyle and previous way of life in Shanghai.

But had she not been

Mao's wife, she would not have been in a position to act as she did. Equally important,
the CR would not have been the same without her influence. Her personality alone would
have made her many enemies, but whether they would have persecuted her to the extent
she persecuted them is doubtful. Madame Mao became, in the words of Edward Rice,
the CR's "grand inquisitor.

The grand inquisitor was herself soon to be inquisitioned.
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CHAPTERS

GRAND FINALE
The Curtain Falls
According to traditional Chinese beUef natural disasters are omens of political
change. An earthquake centered near the northern China city of Tangshan, "the worst
disaster of its kind in the history of mankind," preceded by six weeks the death of Mao
Zedong. ^ One month later, on October 8, "every radio broadcast the electrifying news:
"The Central Committee, under the leadership of First Party Vice-Chairman Hua Guofeng,
has completely smashed the counter-revolutionary group, the Gang of Four! I!!'." The
"Gang" included Zhang Chunqiao, Wang Hongwen, Yao Wenyuan, and JQ.^
Sreemati Chakrabarti, based on radio reports from the Himan Provincial Service,
wrote that three types o f charges were initially made against the gang. He categorized
these as vague, minor, and concrete.^ Examples of vague charges were such things as
"sabotaging Chairman Mao's instructions," "hampering the economy of Hunan," and
"discouraging agricultural mechanization in Hunan province." Minor offenses included
"purposely delaying by 53 minutes the plane carrying representatives from Hunan to
Beijing to mourn Mao" and "the drinking of wine during the mourning period." The
concrete charges were equally innocuous: "They attacked the opera 'Gardener's Song' and
criticized and censored the movie 'Pioneers'" and "forced Zo Dabring [who had played a
leading female role in local Hunan opera] to conduct self-criticism." 'Gardener’s Song' had
been staged successfully in 1972, was later filmed, and withdrawn because JQ thought it
73
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"negated the CR." All o f the concrete "crimes" included in this list are o f this relatively
minor nature, and all involved genuinely cultural, not political, activities. As Hunan was
mentioned prominently in these broadcasts from Hunan, similar sets of complaints
appropriate for other provinces were no doubt issued .
For all the horrors and excesses of the CR, these charges seem innocent enough.
However, within the Chinese conception of justice there is a distinction between // and fa.
Professor Benjamin Schwartz explained that // has been translated as "propriety," whilefa
has been translated as "laws."'^ Observing^ meant adhering to written, codified statutes,
while observing li involved doing what one was expected to do, given one's position in
life. JQ and the Gang o f Four had committed "crimes" in the sense that they had acted in
ways high governmental officials were not supposed to act. They were accused of
violating //, not fa, but the accusations were no less serious because of that. The Chinese
government would take four years to prepare criminal charges.
Not long after the arrest of the Gang of Four, Time magazine published a cover
story on Jiang Qing (March 21, 1977), keyed to the publication ofWitke's biography, and
which contained long excerpts from that book. Time announced that she was one of the
world's most powerful women (but did not suggest any other women who were as
powerful). The article reflected certain American misconceptions of JQ. One
misconception was the common one, that her importance was confined to cultural matters.
A second was that her criminal activities occurred late in the CR, after the rise o f the Gang
of Four, and were related to attempts to "seize power." This misconception conveniently
separated JQ from any earlier wrong-doing by Mao. Adding to her mystique. Time
described JQ as "A woman of great complexity,. . . very intelligent, capable of great
charm. She is also arrogant, unpredictable, self-centered. She is tireless, nervous,
excitable."^ But Time exaggerated the charges when it had reported eaiiier that during
Mao's last illness, "she tried to murder him."^ Nothing of this serious nature was
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mentioned at her trials, nor by Mao's physician, Li. Newsweek acknowledged her
aspirations to succeed Mao, and reported that she circulated a poem by Mao that urged
her "to reach the top," and to complete the revolution he had begun.^
The Gang of Four trials, which began in November, 1980, actually involved ten
defendants. In addition to the "Gang," they included Chen Boda and five generals
associated with Lin Biao, who had been arrested at the time o f his death in 1971.^ In an
ironic turn of events, JQ was linked in these trials with Lin. One part of the report of the
trial was entitled "Records of the Trial by the People's Supreme Court Against Major
Defendants o f the Anti-Revolutionary Clique o f Lin Biao and JQ

Yet JQ's alliance with

Lin had been brief, and she was feuding with him long before the exposure of his plots
against Mao's life. JQ was apparently linked with Lin, whose criminality was not
questioned by the Chinese, to reinforce, by association, the idea of her own guilt.
At their trial, the four were accused o f committing national betrayal, hampering
foreign trade, ruining the educational system, threatening civil war, counter-revolutionary
activity, framing innocent people, being ambitious, trying to capture supreme power, and
insulting people, among other charges.

The actual indictment against the defendants,

"Indictment o f the Special Procuratorate," spelled out in some detail forty-eight more or
less specific crimes. ^^ Lin Biao and Kang Sheng, although necessarily not present at the
trial, were prominently mentioned in the charges. Item three was typical: "Jiang Qing and
Kang Sheng cooked up false charges to persecute Members o f the Eight CCP Central
Committee." Also, at one time, JQ had sent emissaries to Mao to persuade him not to
make Deng Xiaoping a Vice Premier, hence, another violation of li, not fa.
JQ was tried last. Terrill suggested that by placing her trial tenth, the all-male
court attempted to further denigrate her.*^ But her placement in tenth position can also
be interpreted as an admission o f her importance. At her trial, JQ pleaded that she was
Mao's dog, biting whom he said to bite.^^ She cursed her enemies, and insulted the court
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and prosecutors. "In the face o f irrefutable evidence that she collaborated with Kang
Sheng to concoct cases against the revolutionary cadres o f the Eighth Central Committee,
JQ had the impudence to hurl insults at witnesses and disrupt the order o f the court."
When questioned about the events of April, 1976, in Tiananmen Square, when the
government suppressed supporters of Zhou Enlai, JQ responded, "Don't ask me, ask the
man who was Minister of Public Security at the time [i.e., none other than Hua
Gu o f e n g ] . " H e r defiance at least illustrated her courage, and even won the admiration
of some, as it was clear that she would not kowtow to the judges who literally held her life
in their hands.
Beginning in October of 1967, and continuing for three years, Kang Sheng had
supervised 700 military clerks in a search for references to activities in Shanghai of JQ,
Zhang Chunqiao, and himself, dating from the 1930s.

The point of this was to eliminate

any evidence that could be used against these three during and after the CR, and JQ "lived
in constant fear of possible revelations about her past."

It is a testimony to Kang's

thoroughness, perhaps, that he was successful in such an imposing project, for nothing of
this period of JQ's life was mentioned at her trial. Kang became ill of cancer in 1970, and
died in 1975. Terrill reported that Kang kept some files on JQ which showed that she had
indeed been a GMD collaborator in the 1930s.

On the basis of evidence disclosed at the

Gang of Four trials, Kang was implicated in many acts of cruelty, and some people
concluded that he was "The brains behind the Gang of Four."

Throughout the CR,

Kang had been JQ's friend and ally, and much of her influence was due to his support.
Had he lived long enough, there may have been a Gang of Five.
Chinese tradition maintained that the accused at a trial first confess to the crime
before sentence was passed. In spite of claiming to being a loyal Communist, JQ was too
much of an individualist to accept this doctrine when applied to herself. Harvard Law
Professor Jerome Cohen wrote that "intensive interrogations in an inquisitorial setting.
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long periods of detention between interrogations, constant repetition o f the theme of
leniency for those who confess, and application of other psychological techniques to break
the suspect's resistance create an inherently coercive environment that elicits many
confessions."^^ JQ did not succumb to this pressure, intimidation, imprisonment, and
threat of execution, and remained unrepentant and defiant. Professor S. K. Ghosh cited
"two cardinal sins" that JQ committed, apart from any crimes o f which she was accused:
"She challenged the authority of the court, which is seen as sacred, being the symbol of the
nation, and she showed 'insincerity' by not making a confession.

Eight of the

defendants meekly admitted to various crimes; Zhang Chunqiao remained silent, refusing
even to acknowledge the legitimacy of the court. Newsweek reported that at one time the
trials had to be postponed because JQ continued to insist that she acted with Mao's
consent and refused to confess.^^
Business Week reported that the general theme of the trials was that an ill and
aging Mao was exploited by the Gang of Four.

Ghosh echoed this idea: "it was the

effective judgment o f the court that. . . during the last few years of his life, Mao had no
effective control over the 'Gang' led by JQ, who, in view of her closeness to the Chairman,
took maximum advantage of the situation and dominated the Chinese political scene.
Butterfield described the trials as being "disguised as a Beijing opera, complete
with rehearsals," and they reminded others of organized struggle sessions.^^ Newsweek
confirmed this theatrical aspect of the proceedings; "one pre-trial hearing was filmed three
times before officials were happy with JQ's performance."

Although some aspects of

the trials were televised, many of the proceedings were held in secrecy. Public television
versions of the trials had been heavily edited.^^
Reminding the court that she had accompanied Mao to the battle front in WWn,
JQ asked the judges where they had been hiding at the time. She was removed from the
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courtroom on more than one occasion, shouting the CR slogans "To rebel is justified," and
"Revolution is no crime.

In a final act of defiance and in a belief that she would be

killed, JQ challenged the court to execute her in public, in Tiananmen Square. She was
actually sentenced to death, but given two years time in which to "reform." At the end of
the two years, the sentence was changed to life imprisonment.
There were few women with whom JQ had close fiiendships, and instances of her
vindictive attitude towards specific women has been documented here. She did not
contribute significantly to feminist causes in general, and her attitude toward males is
illustrated by the comment that "Man's contribution to human history is nothing more than
a drop o f sperm.

Having thus alienated herself from both sexes, JQ had few persons to

defend her. Li added credence to the belief that she was generally disliked, or feared, even
by those close to her, when he quoted Wang Dongxing, head of security for Mao for many
years, who said that he "would go to the end o f the earth to get rid of JQ."^®
The trials were a cause of general happiness among the Chinese people; "at last
we had someone to blame for our miseries."^^ Some shops exhausted their supplies of
alcoholic beverages, as people celebrated. Meals consisting of four crabs —three male
and one female —became very popular, as a crab, with its sideways, broad manner of
walking, was a symbol of someone wanting to "hog the whole road." The Gang of Four
members became objects of social ridicule. A comedy sketch "Maozi Gungchang" ("The
Hat Factory," 1977, by Chang Guitian and Chang Baohua) satirized them for putting
"hats" —that is, labels, or unfair accusations —on people. "Whiteboned Demon
Unmasked" was a lengthy comedy routine (by Ma Ji and Tang Jiezhong) directed at JQ
herself.

JQ was viciously satirized in this comedy act, in which an autopsy" was

performed on her body, and a second face found on the back o f her head, symbolizing the
public perception of her hypocrisy in urging them to live a life o f austerity and sacrifice.
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while she herself led quite another lifestyle. When her stomach was opened, worms
tumbled out, which the comedians (humorously) stomped on, all over the stage.^^
The Gang of Four became symbols "upon whom the Chinese people could vent
their anger," but for many Chinese intellectuals, "the Gang of Four remained a flimsy
answer to a problem that required deeper explanation. It was ridiculous to think that four
people somehow did it all."^'* Indeed, four people did not do it all, but in a movement of
such complexity, involving so many, the separation of the guilty from the innocent was an
impossible task.
In a "Resolution on Certain Questions in the HSstory of our Party Since The
Founding of the People's Republic of China," adopted June 27,1981, at the Sixth Plenary
Session of the Eleventh Central Committee of the CCP, the ideas and practices of the CR
and the Ninth Congress were renounced.^^ This document placed responsibility for the
CR on Mao, and accused Mao of committing errors in not adhering to "Mao Zedong
Thought." The thought' of the man was to be revered, if not the man himself.

Critical Reviews

China is too vast and complex a stage for any one person to direct the entire scope
o f events that occur therein, but it has been the thesis of this paper that JQ had a major
influence on the events of the CR. She was a unique person in a unique position at a
critical time in China's history, and was a suitable vehicle to carry out the ideas of this
revolution. The CR was the product of Mao's plan and JQ's personality. She determined
its emphasis and much of the extent to which it was violent. Without her presence, the CR
would have been a far different event in China's history. Terrill, recognizing something of
her importance, suggested that "without JQ there may not have been a CR, and certainly
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Mao would not have called it a cultural revolution."^^ Various writers have ascribed to
JQ a responsibility here or there, or on this point or that point, but no single source has
attributed the importance to JQ that I have assigned to her here. Chinese authorities were
not misled about her relevance. For all the horrors of the CR, she was one of only two
persons (the other being Zhang Chunqiao) who was sentenced to death. The significance
of this was lost on Western writers.
Early Western historians o f the CR gave little attention to Madame Mao. In The
Cultural Revolution in China (Berkeley, 1971), Thomas Robinson, ed., Jiang Qing was
mentioned only once, and then in a footnote. A major study by Roderick MacFarquhar,
The Origins of the Cultural Revolution (New York, 1974), gave her little more notice and
no more significance. In China in Ferment, by Richard Baum (Englewood Cliflfe, 1971),
JQ was listed only in a chronology of events, in connection with a Red Guard speech.
Franklin Houn noted that the article criticizing "Hai Rui's Dismissal" had been "written
under the direct guidance of Mao's wife, Chiang Ch'ing," and acknowledged that she "was
shortly to play a leading role in the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution," but he did not
develop the theme of her contributions in this role.^^
Maurice Meisneris Mao's China and After (London, 1986), an updated version of
his original work Mao's China (New York, 1977), is a major source of information on the
CR. In the 1986 version, Meisner acknowledged that earlier he had known little about the
Gang of Four.^* A new chapter on the "concept of cultural revolution" was added, but
even the new version shows little appreciation o f the revolution's cultural significance, and
JQ's role is merely one of making radical speeches.
Later writers of the 1980s, of whom Rodzinski is typical, began to acknowledge
JQ's presence, but only in the context of a group; "the clique of JQ" or "the faction to
which JQ belonged" are ways in which she was referred to then. Craig Dietrich's People's
China (New York, 1986) is a readable account of the period, but Dietrich likewise viewed
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her as one o f the radical faction, allied with Chen Boda. This phraseology tacitly
recognized her importance, by making her the group leader. John K. Fairbank, in his
popular text East Asia, (Revised Edition, Boston, 1989), mentioned JQ only in passing. In
the excellent book The Search for Modem China (New York, 1990), Jonathan Spence
gave few details on JQ, although his biographical sketch referred to her as "a major
political figure of the CR."^^ In 1989, Nfichael Schoenhals, a researcher for the Swedish
Research Council for the Humanities and Social Sciences, reviewed over a dozen official
and unofficial histories and collections of articles on the CR."*® Yet in his reviews of these
works, Schoenhals referred to JQ twice, and then only in relation to Lin Biao. Schoenhals
did make numerous references to the Gang of Four, a partial admission of her importance,
but only within that group.
New Perspectives on the Cultural Revolution (1991), a collection of scholarly
articles edited by William Joseph, Christine Wong, and David Zweig, gave scant notice to
JQ. She was mentioned (of necessity) in Richard Kraus' article "Art Policies o f the
Cultural Revolution," but Kraus' subtitle, "The Rise and Fall of Cultural Minister Yu
Huiyong," indicated his main interest. For all of these writers, and many more, the CR
may very well have occurred without JQ's presence.
More surprising is the fact that her major American biographer, Roxane Witke,
did not acknowledge her political significance. Part V of her book, summarizing JQ's
achievements, was entitled "Mistress of the Arts.'"^^ Witke viewed JQ as aspiring to
"supreme cultural control," but she had not carefully examined JQ's role in the CR.^^ For
her, JQ's political life was as "one of the Gang of Four." Terrill's more extensive
biography of JQ still regarded her primarily as "Mao's wife," and traced her CR activity as
a series of vindictive acts against past enemies. IBs chapter on her life in the 1960s is
entitled simply "Recovery [i.e. fi’om illnesses of the 1950s] and R e v e n g e . B u t while
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Terrill acknowledged something of her importance, he did not attribute to her any political
prominence.
The Bibliographical Essays section of Volume 15 (1991) of the authoritative
Cambridge History of China recorded this observation; "Interestingly, there have been
few fUl-length scholarly studies devoted to the C R ."^ This comment remains true today.
A reason for this may be that the events are still too recent to allow for the historical
perspective required for scholarly analysis. It was foreign journalists and diplomats,
looking from the outside in, that provided much o f the record of that period. The
Cambridge IBstory continued with another interesting observation; "little has been written
that focuses specifically on Mao's role in the m o v e m e n t . T h e lack of studies on Mao
indicates that perhaps his role was not central in understanding much that happened during
theCR.
A major reason writers overlooked JQ's influence during the CR was of course
that she was difficult to distinguish within the immense shadow of Mao. Her dependence
on Mao extended beyond relying on his political authority. "While Mao was alive, JQ had
been accorded the greatest respect. When she walked into a meeting, everyone would
stand and the room would fall silent." After Mao's death, "No one paid any attention
when she came into the room .. . the atmosphere within the Politburo had been
transformed.'"^ Beyond the obvious conclusion that JQ was dependent for her political
power on the fact that she had been Mao's wife, there is the additional point here that after
Mao was gone, Chinese officials no longer felt that they even had to be polite to her.
Another reason JQ has been overlooked may be due to preconceptions about
women's abilities to contribute. Mark Selden's otherwise fine book on the Yanan years,
for instance, can be read without ever learning that JQ (or Ding Ling) were present
t her e. Fur t her , JQ was neither wise nor benevolent, and persons who believe that
countries are governed by wise and benevolent rulers, acting in the best interests of the
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citizenry that they govern, will be disappointed in the view expressed here that JQ was a
nuyor Actor in determining the course o f China's history during the CR. Because she
lacked a significant, positive political theory of her own, it does not follow that she was
not influential.
JQ was tried in a Chinese court, and little that is new by the way of judgment will
be presented here. Her interviews with Witke are almost entirely accounts of herself and
her feuds and disputes with other people, and it was charged against JQ that these
interviews were not conduct befitting a Communist leader. But Mao had not been
censured for several interviews with the American journalist Edgar Snow, and JQ had no
doubt been motivated by Mao’s earlier interviews in seeking her own biographer.
Throughout her life, JQ's relationships with so many people were antagonistic.
Motivated by vindictiveness and jealousy, she sought to redress wrongs she imagined to
have suffered as long ago as forty years earlier. Anyone who disagreed with JQ, or
opposed her in any way, became an enemy and an object of revenge. But she fell out of
favor with the Chinese people, and her fall confirmed the Chinese saying that for a leader
to lose the peoples' hearts is to lose the world. Deng Xiaping, shortly before her trial,
remarked that "She is a very, very, evil woman. She is so evil that any evil thing you say
about her isn't evil enough.
Who can predict the further excesses the people of China would have had to
endure, had JQ succeeded in her aspiration of becoming head of the Communist Party,
virtually a position o f Empress? Whatever form her rule would have taken, it would have
sooner or later self-destructed: the constant themes o f revolution and the rejection of
authority would have led to its own ruin. JQ as empress? Surely she would at least have
taken a new name! We cannot believe that this would have been a productive time for
China. The theme o f continuing revolution soon becomes revolution for its own sake,
with no other purpose, as happened with much of the fighting between factions of RGs.
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JQ's political theories were merely repetitions of Maoism, and those were dated views that
belonged to a China which had not been enlightened by exposure to the effects of those
views when put into the hands of political extremists.
A cynical interpretation of the CR would view it as the scenario of a power
struggle among Chinese leaders. Yao Ming-le described the CR as a three-way power
struggle between JQ, Lin Biao and Zhou Enlai.'*^ That JQ and Lin Biao desired the most
powerful position as head of the CCP is now clear. It is not clear that Zhou wanted this
power for himself and his position throughout the CR was one of moderation, and a
genuine desire for the welfare of the Chinese, rather than a blind adherence to a political
doctrine. And Terrill adopted this cynical view when he wrote of the CR that there was
"nothing rational beneath the vanity, frustration and thirst for revenge that triggered it."^®
But an idealist interpretation would view the CR as an attempt to convert the
thinking of the masses to the "pure" thought of true communism, as propounded by
Chairman Mao. This view would make the CR analogous to a religious movement, and
indeed the similarities are numerous: the single-minded fervor of the true believer, the
mind numbing repetition of litany-like slogans, the appeal to the emotions of the crowds to
sweep away unrighteousness, the near deification of Mao, and yes, even the extreme
cruelty shown to those unwilling to accept the new doctrine, which was to "touch people's
souls." "Confess and repent" are slogans of evangelists, and are words that have firm
religious connotations. Similar ideas of the CR were to "cleanse human nature o f egotism"
via a "perpetual process of purification."^^ JQ and her followers, who had no strong
religious backgrounds or beliefs, sought to destroy and change human nature, and to
coerce human activity into other-directed behavior in accordance with their preconceived
theories. They unknowingly resorted to well-known religious techniques of the Western
world as a practical means o f achieving those objectives.
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Tang Tsou, among others, has noted that "one of the most extraordinary and
puzzling events of the 20th century is surely the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution in
China.

It has been a secondary objective of this thesis to partially disagree with this

assessment, and to show that while the events of the CR were certainly not predictable,
they were, by occurring within the political situation of China as they did, to some extent
understandable.
JQ was sentenced to death in January 1981, subject to a two-year period in which
she could show signs of rehabilitation. Adding to her humiliation in a petty way, the
People's Daily referred to her as a "third-rate actress."^^ She was imprisoned in Qin
Cheng Number One, and her sentence was changed to life imprisonment in January of
1983. Various medical problems, including her throat cancer, began recurring, and she
was allowed to be under house arrest in May, 1984.
Time magazine reported her death by suicide in June, 1991. She was
acknowledged in a follow-up article to have "wielded vast and malevolent power in the
last decade o f Mao's life."^** Witke wrote that after her death, the Chinese government
prohibited the distribution o f books, articles and photographs about her, and forbade radio
and television broadcasts o f the model operas.^^ Witke clung to the kindlier portrayal of
JQ from her 1972 interviews, and attributed more vicious portraits to a "cunning
distortion" of those interviews. Although she attributed paranoia and hyprochrondria to
JQ, Witke still respected her enough to speculate that Mao, declining in health during the
1970s, may have needed JQ's support of his image to remain in his top position. JQ was,
during the time of the CR, "the most powerful woman in the world.
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NOTES

1. Onate, 540. The cause of Mao's death, on September 9, 1976, was widely
reported as Paridnson's disease. His physician, Li Zhisui, however, said that it was due to
a rare motor neuron disorder, popularly known as Lou Gehrig's disease (p. 9).
2. Liang Heng and Judith Shapiro, Son o f the Revolution (New York, 1983),
264. Wang Hongwen, a vice chairman of the CCP from 1969 to 1976, has not been
discussed here. HoUingworth (p. 273) stated that he had become the third man in the
Party, but that "he did little but run around for Jiang Qing."
3. Sreemati Chakrabarti, "Campaign Against the 'Gang of Fouf in Hunan: The
Early Phase," China Report, XVI, #3 (May-June, 1980), 27-33.
4. Benjamin Schwartz, "On Attitudes toward Law in China," Jerome Alan
Cohen. The Criminal Process in the People's Republic o f China. 1949-1963 (Cambridge.
Mass., 1968), 62-70, citing Milton Katz, Government Under Law and the Individual
(Washington, D C , 1957), 27-39.
5. Time, June 21, 1977, p. 42+.
6. Ibid., November 29, 1976, p. 32
7. Newsweek. October 25, 1976, p. 51 and November 8, 1976, p. 40.
8. Dietrich, 267-68.
9. Myers, vol. 2, 361.
10. Onate, 540.
11. Myers, vol. 4., 110-142.
12. Terrill, Madame, 14.
13. Ibid., 412. Terrill gave a good account o f her conduct at the trial, p. 379-92.
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14. Myers, vol. 2, 373, citing People’s Daily (undated).
15. Ghosh, 7.
16. Byron, 336-37.
17. Bamouin, 209.
18. Terrill, Madame, 356. Kang confided this information to Wang Hairong and
Nancy Tang, two close associates of Mao, during his final illness. These two decided not
to report the matter to Mao.
19. Byron, 416,418. Kang was posthumously expelled fi"om the CCP in 1980.
20. Cohen, 49. A revised criminal code in 1979 prohibited forced confessions.
21. Ghosh, 6.
22. Newsweek, November 17, 1980, p. 63.
23. Business Week, November 24, 1980, p. 63.Business Week also noted that
Mao's pictures were being removed firom public places, and that there were fewer
references to his economic and political theories, in anticipation of the eventual "reinterpretation" of Mao.
24. Ghosh, 7.
25. Butterfield, 357.
26. Newsweek, December 8, 1980, p. 59.
27. Time, December 15, 1980, p. 45.
28. Ibid., January 5, 1981, p. 69, and January 12, 1981, p. 27.
29. Terrill, Madame, 302, citing Issues and Studies, September, 1977, p. 104.
30. Li, 621.
31. Liang, 264.
32. Perry Link, "The Genie and the Lamp: Revolutionary
McDougall, 85, citing Art Tune tapes, Hong Kong, no. BA-138, and 107.
33. Jay and Linda Mathews, One Billion: A China Chronicle (New York, 1983),
309.
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34. Perry Link. Evening Chats in Beijing (New York. 1992), 153.
35. Myers, vol. 4, 43-94.
36. Terrill, Madame, 298.
37. Houn, 295.
38. Meisner, Mao's China and After, xi.
39. Spence, 797.
40. Michael Schoenhals, "Unofficial and Official Histories o f the Cultural
Revolution - a Review Article," The Journal of Asian Studies, 48 (August, 1989), 563-72.
41. Witke, Comrade, 378-478.
42. Ibid., 375.
43. Terrill, Madame, 237-301.
44. Denis Twitchett and John K. Fairbank, eds., "Bibliographical Essays," in The
Cambridge History of China, vol. 15 (Cambridge, 1991X 895.
45. Ibid., 896.
46. Li, 629.
47. Mark Selden, China in Revolution: the Yanan Way Revisited (Armonk, N.Y.,
1995). Originally published in 1970.
48. New York Times, August 31, 1980, p. 1.
49. Yao, 193.
50. Terrill, Madame, 298.
51. Kamow, 222.
52. Tang, 67.
53. Myers, vol. 2, 373, citing People's Daily, (no date).
54. Time, June 10, 1991, p. 15 and June 17, 1991, p. 79.
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55. Witke, "The Last Days of Madame Mao " Vanity Fair (December, 1991),
134+.
56. Witke, Comrade, 4.
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